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FIGHTING WORDS AS FREE SPEECH
STEPHEN W. GARD*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is now settled that "above all else, the first amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."' Despite the uni-
versal acceptance of this general principle, the United States Supreme
Court has created several exceptions.' In appropriate cases libel,3 ob-
scenity,4 commercial speech,5 and offensive language6 may be censored
without contravention of the first amendment guarantee of freedom of
expression. The source of each of these exceptions to the general prin-
ciple of governmental neutrality regarding the content of expression is
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.7
Chaplinsky is the only case in which the Supreme Court has affirmed
a conviction based on the defendant's expression of fighting words.' It
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law. B.A., DePauw University, 1969; J.D., Indiana University, Indianapolis Law School, 1973;
LL.M., University of Chicago, 1975.
1. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See First Nat'l Bank of Bos-
ton v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,784-86 (1978); City of Madison, Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 215 (1975). See generally Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amend-
ment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975).
2. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (same).
3. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
4. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
5. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942).
6. Compare FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) andYoung v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) with Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) and
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
7. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
8. But ef Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1957). (Supreme Court up-
holding an injunction prohibiting the intimidation or coercion of the company's employees by
labor pickets. holding that the epithet "scab" was not protected speech when coupled with numer-
ous acts of violence). Later cases, however, have made it clear that the term "scab" and similar
epithets commonly employed during labor disputes are protected expression. See, e.g., Letter
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thus represents the origin and the acme of the fighting words doctrine.
Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, engaged in religious evangelism on
the public streets of Rochester, New Hampshire, despite the warning of
the City Marshal "that the crowd was getting restless and that he would
better go slow."9 Some time later a traffic officer led Chaplinsky to-
ward the local police station, apparently in an effort to protect him
from the crowd that had grown violent. 10 They encountered the City
Marshal again and Chaplinsky said to him, "You are a God damned
racketeer" and "a damned Fascist and the whole government of Roch-
ester are Fascists or agents of Fascists."" The City Marshal did not
react violently to Chaplinsky's statements but instead arrested him for
violating a New Hampshire statute that provided: "No person shall
address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person
who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any
offensive or derisive name. ... 12 Chaplinsky claimed he made these
statements because he was provoked by the failure of the police to
make a reasonable effort to control the crowd while he was proselytiz-
ing and because the Marshal first called him a "damned bastard."13
Chaplinsky's subsequent conviction was affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court on the basis of the narrow construction given the
statute by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire:
[N]o words were forbidden except such as have a direct tendency to
cause acts of violence by the person to whom individually, the remark is
addressed. 14
The statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face
words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee,
words whose speaking constitutes a breach of the peace by the speaker-
Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,282-83 (1974); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53,
60-61 (1966).
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court, in dicta, continues to assert that fighting
words are constitutionally punishable. See, e-g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745
(1978) (plurality opinion); Id. at 763 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
523 (1972); id. at 536-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
9. State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 313, 18 A.2d 754, 758 (1941).
10. Id. at 313, 18 A.2d at 757. See also 315 U.S. at 570.
11. Id. at 312, 18 A.2d at 757. See also 315 U.S. at 569.
12. Id. at 312, 18 A.2d at 757. See also 315 U.S. at 569.
13. .Id. at 315-16, 18 A.2d at 758-59. See also 315 U.S. at 570 (noting merely that Chaplinsky
claimed the City Marshal had "cursed him.').
14. 315 U.S. at 573 (footnote omitted) (quoting 91 N.H. at 313, 18 A.2d at 758).
[Vol. 58:531
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including "classical fighting words," words in current use less "classical"
but equally likely to cause violence, and other disorderly words, including
profanity, obscenity and threats.' 5
The narrow holding of the Supreme Court was simply that the New
Hampshire statute was justified by the state's overriding interest in pre-
serving the public peace by prohibiting "words likely to cause an aver-
age addressee to fight."' 6 The Court did not find any constitutional
infirmity in the application of the statute to punish Chaplinsky's un-
seemly language observing, "a]rgument is unnecessary to demonstrate
that the appellations 'damned racketeer' and 'damned Fascist' are epi-
thets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby
cause a breach of the peace."' 7 Consistent with the rationale of
preventing responsive violence, the Court also upheld the refusal to ad-
mit evidence of truth or provocation as a defense.18
If the foregoing were the extent of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Chaplinsky, its underlying rationale would be clear. Unfortunately, the
Court added a bit of unnecessary dicta that has served to bedevil first
amendment jurisprudence:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essen-
tial part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 19
15. Id. (quoting 91 N.H. at 321, 18 A.2d at 762).
16. Id. (quoting 91 N.H. at 320, 18 A.2d at 762).
17. Id. at 574.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted). The source of this passage was obviously Professor
Chafee, one of the most concerned and committed advocates of free expression our nation has
ever known. See Z. CHAFEE, FanE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES 150 (1946):
[Pirofanity and indecent talk and pictures, which do not form an essential part of any
exposition of ideas, have a very slight social value as a step toward truth, which is clearly
outweighed by the social interests in order, morality, the training of the young, and the
peace of mind of those who hear and see.
Ironically, a reading of Professor Chafee's entire discussion of the issue of unseemly language
discloses three startling facts. First, Chafee did not advocate the exclusion of such expression
from constitutional protection, but merely attempted to rationalize a result which he believed
settled. Id. at 149. Second, he believed that the real grievance against such expression is that it
inflicts emotional injury or threatens to cause a breach of the peace. Id. at 149-51. Finally,
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This ambiguous passage suggests three rationales in addition to the
prevention of responsive violence to justify the censorship of fighting
words: (1) that such words are not "speech" within the meaning of the
first amendment because they are unnecessary to the expression of
ideas and thus lack social utility;20 (2) that such words are akin to ver-
bal assaults and inflict emotional distress upon their recipient; and (3)
that whatever slight social value such words may possess is per se out-
weighed by the psychic injury and responsive violence caused by them.
Historical research indicates that Chaplinsky was intended to be a very
narrow opinion premised on the sole ground that the first amendment
did not foreclose the states from preserving the public peace by prohib-
iting words thought likely to cause a brawl. The expansive dicta was
not intended to have any doctrinal significance.2'
Subsequent Supreme Court cases demonstrate that the fighting
words doctrine is to be narrowly limited to its original purpose and that
the sole justification for the prohibition of fighting words is their per-
ceived propensity to cause responsive violence by the individual to
whom the offending words are addressed.22
In the almost forty years since Chaplinsky was decided, the Court has
not upheld a single conviction for the use of fighting words. Instead, it
has avoided the opportunity to address the issue by relying on the over-
breadth principle that a statute that indiscriminately sweeps both un-
protected and protected activity within its penal scope is
unconstitutional on its face.23 This has led Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun to charge that "the Court, despite its protestations to
the contrary, is merely paying lip service to Chaplinsky" and that, in
Chafee was well aware of the danger of abuse inherent in the penalization of such expression and
urged that "all of these crimes of injurious words must be kept within very narrow limits if they
are not to give excessive opportunities for outlawing heterodox ideas." Id. at 152.
20. This rationale for the suppression of distasteful expression was first suggested by dicta in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940).
21. See Yarbrough, The Burger Court and Freedom of Expression, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
37, 53-54 (1976). Cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 272-73 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting)
(Chaplinsky does not make broad inroads on first amendment freedoms).
22. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
23. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Plummer v. City of Colum-
bus, 414 U.S. 2 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). On the overbreadth doctrine
generally, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 710-14 (1978); Note, The FirstAmend
ment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844 (1970).
[Vol. 58:531
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fact, the fighting words doctrine is moribund.24
In contrast to its disfavored status in the Supreme Court, the fighting
words doctrine retains a surprising vitality in the lower courts.25 Village
of Skokie v. National Socialist Party ofAmerica26 is merely one particu-
larly vivid example of the invocation of this doctrine as a justification
for the penalization of unseemly or offensive expression with political
overtones. In Village of Skokie the court of appeals of Illinois upheld
the issuance of an injunction prohibiting members of the National So-
cialist Party from wearing their party emblem, the swastika, during a
planned demonstration in Skokie, Illinois, on the ground that it consti-
tuted fighting words.
In the midst of the confusion and uncertainty as to the substantive
content and continued vitality of the fighting words doctrine there has
been, aside from the cursory descriptive treatment afforded by constitu-
tional law hornbooks,28 virtually no scholarly comment on the issue.
Furthermore, those scholars who have commented on the issue have
uniformly lamented the Supreme Court's failure to apply the fighting
words doctrine vigorously as a justification for the suppression of un-
seemly expression.2
9
This article first explicates the current status of the fighting words
doctrine and the elements necessary for its proper invocation. Then it
advocates abandonment of the doctrine and recognition of fighting
words as expression deserving of first amendment protection. Neither
the governmental interest in the preservation of the public peace nor
any other rationale offered in defense of the doctrine is adequate to
justify its continued existence.
24. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 537 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Shea,
"Don't Bother to Smile When You Call Me That"--Fighting Words and the First Amendment, 63
KY. L.J. 1, 12 (1975) ("[A] majority of the United States Supreme Court has gradually concluded
that fighting words, no matter how narrowly defined, are a protected form of speech... :').
25. See, e.g., Bousquet v. State, 548 S.W.2d 125 (Ark. 1977); Bolden v. State, 148 Ga. App.
315, 251 S.E.2d 165 (1978); Johnson v. State, 143 Ga. App. 826, 240 S.E.2d 207 (1977); State v.
Boss, 195 Neb. 467, 238 N.W.2d 639 (1976).
26. 51 IU. App. 3d 279, 366 N.E.2d 347 (1977), rev'd, 69 I1. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
27. 51 Ill. App. 3d at 292, 366 N.E.2d at 356.
28. See, e.g., J. BARRON & C. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS 67-76
(1979); J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTrrTIONAL LAW 789-94
(1978); L. TRiE, supra note 23, at 617-23.
29. See A. BicKEL, THE MORALIrry OF CONSENT 72-73 (1975); A. Cox, TE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 45-48 (1976); Rabinowitz, Nazis in Skokie: Fight-
ing Words or Heckler's Veto?, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 259 (1979); Shea, supra note 24.
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In essence, my thesis is that the fighting words doctrine is nothing
more than a quaint remnant of an earlier morality that has no place in
a democratic society dedicated to the principle of free expression. The
doctrine, which operates, at best, to penalize individuals for failing to
show others the respect society deems proper and, at worst, to penalize
individuals for vehement criticism of government officials, is simply not
constitutionally justifiable. Whatever the desirability of maintaining a
polite society, the first amendment prohibits the government from seek-
ing its preservation by means of censoring expression entitled to consti-
tutional protection.
II. THE FIGHTING WORDS DOCTRINE TODAY
Consistent with the doctrine's underlying rationale of protecting the
public peace, the Supreme Court has enunciated the elements that must
be satisfied before a court may justifiably find that a speaker's language
constitutes unprotected fighting words. In addition to the requirement
of intent,30 common to all speech crimes,3 four elements must be pres-
ent before the doctrine will deprive a message of constitutional protec-
tion. First, the utterance must constitute an extremely provocative
personal insult,32 a factor requiring a judicial analysis of the content of
the expression. Second, the words must have a direct tendency to cause
an immediate violent response by the average recipient.33 Third, the
words must be uttered face-to-face to the addressee.34 Fourth, the ut-
terance must be directed to an individual, not a group.35 These final
three requirements are contextual in nature and mandate a judicial
evaluation of the circumstances in which the speech is uttered. If any
30. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Ware v. City and County of Denver,
182 Colo. 177, 511 P.2d 475 (1973); City of Oak Park v. Smith, 79 Mich. App. 757, 262 N.W.2d
900 (1977); State v. Profaci, 56 NJ. 346, 266 A.2d 579 (1970).
31. See, ag., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1954). Cf Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (defamatory statements not constitu-
tionally protected, even though made without "actual malice", when directed toward non-public
figures).
32. See, e.g., Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
33. See, eg., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942).
34. See, eg., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
35. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss3/6
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of these four elements is absent, the expression may not be denied con-
stitutional protection on the ground that it comes within the scope of
the fighting words doctrine.
The requirement that the words constitute a personally abusive
epithet has been largely ignored by the commentators.36 Instead, they
have tended to view this element as submerged within the separate re-
quirement that the words have a direct tendency to cause an immediate
violent reaction from the average addressee. Both elements of the
fighting words doctrine operate to limit its scope to situations constitut-
ing a serious threat to the public peace. Nevertheless, it is myopic to
fail to recognize the requirement that the words constitute a personally
abusive epithet as a separate and distinct element with its own unique
focus and function. The personally abusive epithet element focuses on
the content of the words uttered by the speaker. In contrast, the re-
quirement of a likelihood of a violent reaction focuses on the circum-
stances in which the words are used.
This important difference can best be appreciated by comparing it to
the Supreme Court's test governing the constitutionality of sanctions
imposed on speech that advocates violation of the law or the use of
violence. The two problems, subversive advocacy and fighting words,
are not identical but merely analogous. Subversive advocacy presents
the danger that a sympathetic audience will act upon the speaker's sug-
gestion that a law be violated or that violence be used to achieve a
commonly shared goal. In contrast, the fighting words doctrine is
designed to protect against the danger that a recipient of the speaker's
message will be so outraged that he will respond with violence against
the speaker. In essence, the difference between subversive advocacy
and fighting words is sympathetic versus hostile-listener violence. In
this sense, the two doctrines are designed to deal with contrasting
problems. Nevertheless, an analogy between the doctrines exists, even
if the countervailing nature of the problems with which they are in-
tended to cope makes it unprofitable to consider whether either doc-
trine could be generalized to deal with both situations.
In Brandenburg v. Ohio37 the Supreme Court stated the test that must
be applied to determine whether a statute proscribing the advocacy of
illegal activity can withstand a first amendment challenge:
36. See J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 28; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra
note 28; L. TRIBE, supra note 23; Rabinowitz, supra note 29; Shea, supra note 24.
37. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not per-
mit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.38
The requirement that the speech be likely to produce illegal action or
violence is a restatement of the Holmesian standard that the words
must "create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. '39 This element
of the subversive advocacy test, with its focus on the circumstances in
which the language is spoken, is analogous to the fighting words doc-
trine requirement that the words used must have a direct tendency to
cause an immediate violent reaction from the recipient. The clear and
present danger test proved entirely unsuitable as a tool for evaluating
the constitutionality of governmental regulations proscribing the advo-
cacy of fundamental political change. Rather than a neutral test, it
constituted a formula under which political dissidents were invariably
shuttled off to prison.4" The ambiguity of this circumstance-focused
standard, coupled with its excessive reliance on judicial fact finding of
the most elusive nature,4 permitted even the most conscientious judges
to allow their subjective judgment as to the proximity and degree of
danger to color their constitutional decisionmaking.42 More impor-
38. Id. at 447.
39. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
40. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
41. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. at 570 (Jackson, J., concurring):
If we must decide that this Act and its application are constitutional only if we are
convinced that petitioner's conduct creates a "clear and present danger" of violent over-
throw, we must appraise imponderables, including international and national phenom-
ena which baffle the best informed foreign offices and our most experienced politicians.
...No doctrine can be sound whose application requires us to make a prophecy of that
sort in the guise of a legal decision. The judicial process simply is not adequate to a trial
of such far-flung issues. The answers given would reflect our own political predilections
and nothing more.
42. See, e.g., Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Jan. 2, 1921), reprinted in
Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins ofModern First Amendment Doctrine.- Some Fragments of
History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 770 (1975):
I am not wholly in love with Holmesy's test and the reason is this. Once you admit
that the matter is one of degree, while you may put it where it genuinely belongs, you so
obviously make it a matter of administration, i.e. you give it to Tomdickandharry, D.J.,
so much latitude [here Learned Hand wrote and struck out 'as his own fears may re-
quire,' and continued] that the jig is at once up. Besides their Ineffabilities, the Nine
Elder Statesmen, have not shown themselves wholly immune from the 'herd instinct' and
what seems 'immediate and direct' today may seem very remote next year even though
the circumstances surrounding the utterance be unchanged.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss3/6
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tantly, the clear and present danger test focused exclusively on the gov-
ernmental interest in suppressing expression and ignored the
countervailing social value, which even the most acerbic criticism of
the existing government structure contains. In other words, the clear
and present danger test inquired only whether there was any good rea-
son to censor the speech; it never considered whether the expression
should be constitutionally protected.
To alleviate these failings, Brandenburg relegated the circumstances-
focused clear and present danger element to a secondary status in
which its function would be merely to afford constitutional protection
to the "harmless inciter."'43 As the primary element of its constitutional
doctrine Brandenburg adopted the standard, first enunciated by Judge
Learned Hand in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten," that the speaker's
language must constitute actual incitement, and not mere advocacy of a
political point of view.45 This content-focused inquiry is analogous to
the personally abusive epithet requirement of the fighting words doc-
trine. Both attempt to afford maximum constitutional protection to ex-
pressive activities by insulating speech from governmental sanction
unless its content constitutes "triggers to action'' 6 or "inherently in-
flammatory" remarks.47 Although both assure adequate protection for
the legitimate governmental interest in preventing violence, each con-
stitutes "a qualitative formula, hard, conventional, difficult to evade."4
In addition, the judicial focus on the content of the expression appreci-
ably reduces the influence of the judge's subjective view of the danger
or distastefulness of the expression on the decisionmaking process.
Most importantly, a content-based test approaches the difficult
problems of subversive advocacy and fighting words from the proper
perspective. Rather than inquiring whether the speech should be cen-
sored, this focus begins the process of constitutional adjudication by
recognizing the societal value of the uninhibited communication of
ideas and information. It erects a doctrine explicitly designed to afford
43. See Gunther, supra note 42, at 755.
44. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
45. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). See Gunther, supra note 42, at 722, 724-
29, 752-55; Kalven, Professor Ernst Freundand Debs v. United States, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 235, 236
n.6 (1973).
46. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. at 540.
47. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. at 592.
48. Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Jan. 2,1921), repritedin Gunther,
supra note 42, at 770.
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maximum protection to the values that lie at the very heart of the first
amendment. "[T]he First Amendment's basic guarantee is of freedom
to advocate ideas. '49 The constitutional guarantee extends much fur-
ther, of course, but the bedrock principle is clear: "it is a central tenet
of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in
the marketplace of ideas."' In other words, the essence of the constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom of speech is that the government may not
penalize expression because it disagrees with the ideological message
conveyed.5 1 A necessary corollary to this fundamental first amendment
principle is "that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas
may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offen-
sive to some of their hearers."' 2 This is true even when the offensive
message concerns the person of the recipient, as in the case of words of
disrespect or dislike.-" Speech that conveys the idea that another's con-
duct is disgraceful or shameful cannot, for that reason alone, be cen-
sored.54
Thus, the personally abusive epithet requirement is central to the
first amendment jurisprudence of the fighting words doctrine. The es-
sential meaning of the first amendment is simply that no one may be
penalized because of official disapproval of the ideas conveyed by his
speech. Only when the speaker's message is encapsulated in a form
inherently likely to provoke a reflexive violent response may the gov-
ernment assert a legitimate nonideological interest in its suppression.
The primary requirement of the fighting words doctrine is hence
designed to separate protected expressions of dislike or disrespect for
another-to which the hearer's response, violent or otherwise, is essen-
tially ideological-from those inherently provocative words that trigger
responsive violence more the product of uncontrollable reflex than in-
tellectual decision. Even this latter category of epithet, however, con-
stitutes a "mixed utterance" that contains both "good" and "bad"
49. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959).
50. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) (plurality opinion).
51. See, eg., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58
(1970); West Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See generally Gard, The
4bsoluteness of the First Amendment, 58 NEB. L. REv. 1053 (1979).
52. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. at 592. See also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412
(1974); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970).
53. See, eg., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Plummer v. City of Colum-
bus, 414 U.S. 2 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
54. See, eg., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Norwell v. City of Cincin-
nati, 414 U.S. 14 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
[Vol. 58:531
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elements.55 On the one hand, its ideological message should entitle it
to constitutional protection; on the other hand, its inherent violence
producing character should justify its censorship. The complex nature
of such epithets necessitates a further inquiry into the circumstances of
their use provided by the other three elements of the fighting words
doctrine.
56
The importance of the content-focused personally abusive epithet el-
ement cannot be overestimated. Its function mandates that first
amendment analysis begin with an interpretation and application of
the purpose of the constitutional provision. In essence it guarantees
that the expression of ideas, no matter how offensive or distasteful, will
be afforded constitutional protection. Only after this first amendment
interest in the full protection of the expression of all ideas has been
vindicated is the countervailing governmental interest in preventing
breaches of the peace considered. This mode of analysis is illustrated
by the courts' rigorous application of the requirement that only person-
ally abusive epithets come within the scope of constitutionally unpro-
tected fighting words.
This distinction between the protected expression of even hated ideas
and the unprotected use of verbal brickbats was suggested in the
Supreme Court's first encounter with the fighting words problem. In
Cantwell v. Connecticut57 the defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, stopped
two Roman Catholics on a public street in New Haven, Connecticut,
and, after receiving their permission, played a phonograph record enti-
tled "Enemies", which contained an intemperate attack on the Roman
Catholic religion.58 Both men were angered by the recorded message,
but neither attacked Cantwell. 59 Cantwell was convicted of inciting a
breach of the peace on the theory that his expressive activity created a
danger that those who heard his propaganda would react violently
against him.' The United States Supreme Court unanimously re-
versed the conviction, reasoning that Cantwell did nothing more than
express his religious beliefs, an activity that, "in spite of the probability
of excesses and abuses," cannot be punished as a breach of the peace
55. The significance of complex, mixed utterances in first amendment jurisprudence was first
identified in Kalven, The Metaphyics ofthe Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. RFv. 1, 11-12.
56. See notes 141-44 hftra.
57. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
58. Id. at 302-03, 309.
59. Id. at 303, 309.
60. Id. at 303.
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consistent with the first amendment.6 The Court suggested in dicta
that expression rises to the level of unprotected fighting words only
when it constitutes "[r]esort to epithets or personal abuse." 62
The personally abusive epithet requirement precludes the punish-
ment of the expression of ideas because of a listener's ideological oppo-
sition and is simply an application of "the principle of free thought-
not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the
thought that we hate." 63 This constitutional principle, which "more
imperatively calls for attachment than any other,"' is essential to the
very existence of an open, democratic society.65 In other words, no
people can be truly free if they are unable to express ideas regardless of
how vehemently others may disagree ideologically.
Unfortunately, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,66 the seminal fighting
words case, was insensitive to this fundamental first amendment princi-
ple in a situation in which it should have been most stringently applied.
Chaplinsky's conviction was affirmed on the ground that the words
"God damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist," 67 when addressed to a
law enforcement officer who allegedly failed to provide protection for
the disseminator of unpopular ideas, were likely to cause the average
individual to respond violently.68 The Supreme Court wholly ignored
the issue of whether the words were objectionable merely because of
the ideas they expressed. If the Court had considered this issue it could
not have upheld Chaplinsky's conviction consistent with the first
amendment. Clearly, Chaplinsky's statement was well within the cate-
gory of criticism of. government policy and personnel known as sedi-
tious libel and now recognized as entitled to the highest degree of
61. Id. at 310. The Court did suggest, however, that Cantwell's conduct might be punishable
under "a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and
present danger to a substantial interest of the State . I..." d. at 311.
62. Id. at 309-10. For a more recent, and rather mundane, application of the personally
abusive epithet requirement see Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14 (1973), wherein the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a sixty-nine year old man who "verbally and negatively
protested" what "he obviously felt was a highly questionable detention by a police officer" simply
because he had used "no abusive language or fighting words." Id. at 16.
63. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
64. Id. See also Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137
(1961) (Black J., dissenting).
65. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment', 1964 Sup. CT. Rv. 191, 205, 208-10. See generally Gard, supra note 51.
66. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
67. Id. at 569.
68. Id. at 573-74.
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constitutional protection.69 Given the circumstances in which the re-
marks were uttered and the fact that Chaplinsky completed his sen-
tenced by adding that not only the individual officer but also "the
whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists,"70 to
treat Chaplinsky's allegation of governmental corruption and political
extremism as a personally abusive epithet "strikes at the very center of
the constitutionally protected area of free expression."71
Fortunately, the factual holding in Chaplinsky has been rejected in
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court.72 Furthermore, Chaplin-
sky is irreconcilable with the later development of the personally abu-
sive epithet element of the fighting words doctrine. Thus, for example,
the Court held in Edwards v. South Carolina73 that placards stating "I
am proud to be a Negro" and "Down with Segregation" carried by
civil rights demonstrators could not be censored on the basis of the
fighting words doctrine.74 The Court's rationale was engagingly sim-
ple: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a State to make
criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views."75
The Court reached a similar result in Street v. New York.76 Sidney
Street, who protested against the sniper shooting of civil rights leader
James Meredith, burned his American flag on a New York City street
corner saying, "If they let that happen to Meredith we don't need an
American flag."7 7 He was convicted under a state statute that made it a
crime "publicly [to] mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or
cast contempt upon either by words or act [any flag of the United
States].''"8 Justice Harlan, writing for a majority of the Court, held that
Street's conviction could not be justified on the ground that his lan-
69. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Kalven, supra note
65.
70. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 569.
71. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 292 (holding unconstitutional a similar
attempt to expand the scope of the common law of libel).
72. The Supreme Court has expressly held that the use of the word fascist is "part of the
conventional give-and-take in our economic and political controversies" and hence protected
under federal labor law. Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284 (1974) (quoting Cafeteria
Employees Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943)).
73. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
74. Id. at 236.
75. Id. at 237.
76. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
77. Id. at 578-79.
78. Id. at 577-78 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1425, sub. 16, d (McKinney 1909)).
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guage constituted fighting words. 9 Finding that "any shock effect of
appellant's speech must be attributed to the content of the ideas ex-
pressed," the Supreme Court reaffirmed the basic first amendment
principle that "the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hear-
ers."80
Justice Harlan also authored the opinion of the Court in Cohen v.
California.8 1 The defendant, Paul Robert Cohen, wore a jacket with
the words "Fuck the Draft" plainly visible on the back in a Los Ange-
les courthouse corridor.8 2 He was convicted of disturbing the peace by
"offensive conduct," which the state court defined as "behavior which
has a tendency to provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn dis-
turb the peace."" Reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held
that the first amendment precludes the states from proscribing expres-
sion on the ground that it is officially deemed vulgar or offensive.8 4
The Court also held that the scurrilous message on Cohen's jacket fell
outside the category of unprotected fighting words.8" In so holding,
Justice Harlan defined the narrow class of speech that may be censored
as fighting words as "those personally abusive epithets which, when
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowl-
edge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction. 86 Thus, Cohen in-
corporated the holding of Street into the constitutional doctrine first
enunciated in Chaplinsky by limiting its scope to personally abusive
insults and expressly excluding speech that offends because of the con-
troversial nature Qf its ideological message. Applying this test, Cohen's
conviction could not withstand constitutional scrutiny because no one
"could reasonably have regarded the words on appellant's jacket as a
79. Id. at 592.
80. Id. (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 546-52 (1965)); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963); Terminieflo v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949). Subsequent Supreme
Court decisions have reiterated this fundamental rule of constitutional law. See, e.&, Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970)(quoting
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. at 592).
81. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
82. Id. at 16 (quoting People v. Cohen, I Cal. App. 3d 94, 97, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505 (1969)).
Although women and children were present in the corridor, no one who saw the jacket threatened
Cohen with violence or even voiced an objection. Id. at 20, 22.
83. Id. at 17 (quoting People v. Cohen, I Cal. App. Id at 99, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 506) (emphasis
in original).
84. Id. at 25-26.
85. Id. at 20.
86. Id
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direct personal insult. 87 In other words, a difference of constitutional
magnitude exists between the phrase "Fuck the Draft" and the epithet
"Fuck you."
Ware v. City and County of Denver88 follows the constitutional teach-
ing of Cohen and nicely illustrates both the protected status of the ex-
pression of ideas and the necessity for judicial analysis of the usage
intended by the utterance of words that are commonly used as abusive
epithets. In Ware, the defendant, a member of the audience at a meet-
ing held on the campus of the University of Denver, shouted "fuck
you" in response to an answer given by a representative of the United
States Department of Justice to a question from the audience.89 Re-
versing the defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct, the Supreme
Court of Colorado reasoned perceptively: "It is apparent from the rec-
ord that the outbursts of the defendant and others were responses to
political opinions and the voicing of contrary opinions."90
The most difficult question raised by the personally abusive epithet
requirement concerns the proper treatment of racial and religious slurs.
This issue severely tests the general principle that a listener's ideologi-
cal objection to the content of a communication cannot form the foun-
dation for a fighting words conviction. Recently, in Village of Skokie v.
National Socialist Party of America,91 this issue was presented in a fac-
tual context guaranteed to arouse emotion on all sides. Frank Collin,
leader of the National Socialist Party of America, a small group of neo-
Nazis, announced his group's intention to stage a demonstration in
Skokie, Illinois, to protest a Skokie Park District requirement that the
neo-Nazis post a $350,000 insurance policy as a pre-condition to the
use of Skokie parks.92 The Village of Skokie secured an injunction
from the circuit court of Cook County, Illinois, prohibiting the group
from marching or parading in Skokie in the party's storm trooper uni-
form or marching, parading, or displaying the swastika in Skokie.93 On
appeal, the appellate court of Illinois had no difficulty reversing the
portion of the injunction prohibiting the wearing of the storm trooper
uniform because this uniform constituted a symbolic expression of the
87. Id.
88. 182 Colo. 177, 511 P.2d 475 (1973).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 178, 511 P.2d 475.
91. 51 IM. App. 3d 279, 366 N.E.2d 347 (1977), rev'd, 69 ll 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
92. IM. at 283, 366 N.E.2l at 349-50.
93. Id. at 284-85, 366 N.E.2d at 351.
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Nazi political philosophy.94 This holding is consistent with the funda-
mental first amendment principle that ideological outrage at the con-
tent of a communication is an inadequate predicate to the application
of the fighting words doctrine.
The constitutionality of the injunction against the display of the
swastika presented, in the view of the appellate court, a much more
difficult question. Although the neo-Nazis denied that they endorsed
genocide, it was undisputed that their political philosophy, represented
by the swastika, included the opinion "that American Jews have exces-
sive influence in government and close ties to international Commu-
nism."95 The Court thus had to decide whether a symbol, which
embodies a racial or religious slur and thereby presents a serious dan-
ger of responsive violence by the audience, could be censored because
it constituted unprotected fighting words.
This question was made more difficult because most people regard
the ideas represented by the swastika with particular abhorrence, and
because of the particular sensitivity of the locale chosen by the neo-
Nazis for their demonstration. Skokie is a village containing approxi-
mately 70,000 people, of whom approximately 40,500 are Jewish. In-
cluded within this Jewish population are many survivors and relatives
of survivors of the concentration camps of the Third Reich.96 No
doubt the expression of such a symbolic slur in Skokie presented a
grave risk of a reflexive violent response by the targets of the symbolic
message.9 7 Indeed, this potential for violence convinced the appellate
court to affirm that portion of the injunction prohibiting the display of
the swastika.98
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the decision of the appellate
court in a per curiam opinion. 99 Although the court upheld the reversal
of that portion of the injunction prohibiting the neo-Nazis from wear-
ing their storm trooper uniforms, it further held that the probability of
responsive violence did not distinguish the constitutionality of prohibit-
94. Id. at 288-89, 366 N.E.2d at 354-55.
95. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 680 (N.D. I11.), afl'd578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cer.
denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
96. 51 Il. App. 3d at 282, 366 N.E.2d at 349.
97. There was substantial evidence of a present danger of uncontrollable violence that would
result from the display of the swastika in Skokie. See id. at 284, 366 N.E.2d at 350-5 1.
98. Id. at 293, 366 N.E.2d at 357.
99. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 69 I11.2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21
(1978).
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ing the display of the swastika. 0 Instead, the court held that the per-
sonally abusive epithet requirement, designed to afford constitutional
protection to the expression of all ideas, mandated the reversal of the
injunction:
The display of the swastika, as offensive to the principles of a free na-
tion as the memories it recalls may be, is symbolic political speech in-
tended to convey to the public the beliefs of those who display it. It does
not, in our opinion, fall within the definition of "fighting words". ... 01
The wisdom of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois was confirmed in Collin v. Smith. 2 In that case the federal dis-
trict court recognized that "the [United States Supreme] Court has
several times emphasized that care must be taken to insure that what is
restricted is insulting and offensive language, not the communication of
offensive ideas."'113 Indeed, the principle is so basic that ultimately the
Skokie city officials abandoned the argument that the swastika consti-
tuted unprotected fighting words." 4
Judicial recognition that the danger of responsive violence cannot
justify governmental censorship of racial and religious slurs is well-
founded. "[S]uch outbursts of violence are not the necessary conse-
quence of such speech and, more important, such violence when it does
occur is not the serious evil of the speech."105 The serious evil of racial
and religious slurs is the extraordinary hatefulness and ugliness of the
ideas they espouse and the more remote danger that these ideas will be
accepted and acted upon by some group of fanatics, or perhaps even by
an entire nation." 6 In essence, the objection to such slurs, including
those symbolized by the swastika, is ideological in character.
The holding that the swastika could not be censored consistent with
the first amendment on the ground that it constitutes fighting words
was entirely correct and compatible with our national tradition of unin-
hibited interchange of ideas. In a democratic society even the most
odious ideas must be afforded constitutional protection if the society is
100. Id. at 612-15, 373 N.E.2d at 22-24.
101. Id. at 615, 373 N.E.2d at 24.
102. 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. ILL.), a f'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916
(1978).
103. d. at 690 (emphasis in original).
104. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d at 1203.
105. H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FiRsT AMENDMENT 14-15 (1965). See also Collin v.
Smith, 447 F. Supp. at 697.
106. See H. KALVEN, supra note 105, at 13,14.
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to retain its essential characteristic of popular self-governance. The
possibility that an addressee's justifiable outrage at the content of the
ideas expressed may be manifested by unlawful violence cannot be per-
mitted to sanction a different result.0 7 This is the laudable function of
the personally abusive epithet requirement of the fighting words doc-
trine.
Although a personal invective directed to one private person by an-
other presents the strongest justification for the doctrine, it is virtually
impossible to find fighting words cases that do not involve either the
expression of opinion on issues of public policy or words directed to-
ward a government official, usually a police officer.'08 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court, consistent with the basic proposition that the pro-
tection of the first amendment extends to purely private conmunica-
tions,10 9 has uniformly enunciated the general principle that the
expression of the idea of dislike or disrespect by one private individual
for another is also constitutionally protected. 110
The Supreme Court's opinion in Gooding v. Wilson"' is the best il-
lustration of this application of the personally abusive epithet element
of the fighting words doctrine. Wilson sought federal habeas corpus
relief from his conviction for cursing a police officer on grounds that
the state statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.12 The statute provided: "Any person who shall,
without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence. . . op-
probrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the
peace. . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."'" 3 The Supreme Court
set aside Wilson's conviction on the ground that the statute was facially
unconstitutional without considering whether the language used by
107. See Colin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. at 690: "Even where the audience is so offended by the
ideas being expressed that it becomes disorderly and attempts to silence the speaker, it is the duty
of the police to attempt to protect the speaker, not to silence his speech if it does not consist of
unprotected epithets."
108. But see Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2 (1973) (conviction of cab driver for
vulgar sexual proposition to female passenger reversed on overbreadth grounds); Rozier v. State,
140 Ga. App. 356, 231 S.E.2d 131 (1976) (vulgar sexual proposition to sixteen year old female held
not fighting words).
109. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
110. See, ,g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Plummer v. City of Colum-
bus, 414 U.S. 2 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1973).
111. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
112. Id. at 519.
113. Id. (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6303).
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Wilson constituted fighting words. 1 4 The first amendment, the Court
held, requires that the governing statute be narrowly drawn so as not to
encompass within its proscription speech that is constitutionally pro-
teted. " The statute in Gooding went too far. Dictionary definitions
of the statutory terms included language that merely conveyed disgrace
or harsh insults, and the state courts failed to limit these statutory terms
by judicial construction to encompass only constitutionally punishable
fighting words.'16 Explicitly relying on state cases concerning commu-
nications between purely private individuals, the Supreme Court held
the statutory definition of fighting words in Gooding unconstitutionally
overbroad because it proscribed expression that was merely offensive,
vulgar, insulting, or disgraceful to the person to whom it was ad-
dressed."17
If a court determines that the speaker's language constitutes a per-
sonally abusive epithet, the second element of the fighting words doc-
trine requires that the words, and the circumstances in which they are
spoken, have a direct tendency to cause an immediate violent response
by the addressee." 8 This element recognizes that while the doctrine is
premised on the governmental interest in preventing breaches of the
peace, there is no constitutional justification for proscribing all verbal
invectives. For the doctrine to remain consistent with its underlying
rationale, only those epithets that actually cause an irresistible impulse
to violence within the addressee may be constitutionally censored.
Thus, a proper application of the second element of the fighting words
doctrine mandates a sensitive analysis of the circumstances in which
the words are uttered, and an appreciation of the distinction between
arousal of anger or outrage in the recipient of the language and crea-
tion of an uncontrollable reflexive and violent response.
The Supreme Court paid lip service to this crucial second element in
Chaplinsky when it affirmed the constitutionality of the state statute on
the ground that it proscribed only those words that "have a direct ten-
dency to cause acts of violence by the persons to whom, individually,
114. Id. at 520.
115. Id. at 520-22.
116. Id. at 525-27.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942).
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the remark is addressed."" 9 Unfortunately, the Chaplinsky Court, in
its application of this requirement of a likelihood of an immediate, re-
flexive, violent response, substituted an assumption for analysis. Fail-
ing to evaluate the probable effect of Chaplinsky's insulting language
on the City Marshal or the relevance of the factual context in which the
words were used, the Court simply assumed that certain words inevita-
bly "trigger uncontrollable violent impulses on the part of the ad-
dressee of the words."' 2 ° Fortunately, later Supreme Court cases have
largely rejected Chaplinsky's ill-considered behavioral assumption.
In Terminiello v. Chicago'' the Supreme Court, asserting that it was
unnecessary to reach the fighting words issue,122 made it clear that the
Court would no longer rely on simplistic assumptions to decide the dif-
ficult issue of whether there was a probability of an immediate violent
response by the recipient of the offensive language. Terminiello, a sus-
pended priest, was convicted for an ugly and vicious speech denounc-
ing Blacks and Jews, which he gave in a rented hall in Chicago.
During the speech Terminiello referred to the howling, violent mob of
approximately one thousand persons outside the hall as "slimy scum,"
"snakes," and "bedbugs."' 23 The trial court instructed the jury that the
statutory term "breach of the peace" included speech that "stirs the
public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or
creates a disturbance .. -124 The Supreme Court held that the
breach of the peace ordinance, as so construed, could not withstand
constitutional scrutiny:
Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government
is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and
challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is
why freedom of speech, though not absolute, . . . is nevertheless pro-
tected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a
119. 315 U.S. at 573 (footnote omitted) (quoting State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. at 313, 18 A.2d
at 758).
120. Rutzick, Offensive Lanpuage and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 91 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 8 (1974).
121. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
122. Id. at 3.
123. Id. at 26 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion contains a full
description of Terminiello's speech and the surrounding circumstances. See id. at 14-22.
124. Id. at 3-4.
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clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. . . .There is no room under
our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would
lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant
political or community groups.
The ordinance as construed by the trial court seriously invaded this
province. It permitted conviction of petitioner if his speech stirred people
to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. A
conviction resting on any of those grounds may not stand. 25
Terminieilo thus established the requirement that the words must
create a likelihood of an immediate, violent, reflexive response by the
recipient as a meaningful element of the fighting words doctrine. It is
not sufficient that the addressee might feel anger or outrage. Only
when the addressee experiences an uncontrollable violent impulse will
the fighting words doctrine declare the speech unprotected by the first
amendment. In addition, the Court clearly established that it would no
longer indulge in the simplistic assumption that certain words inevita-
bly provoke such a reaction. Instead, the likelihood of an immediate
violent reaction becomes a factual inquiry largely dependent on the cir-
cumstances surrounding the use of the offensive language.
This distinction between speech that arouses anger and speech that
causes reflexive violence is so central to first amendment jurisprudence
that it has been repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court.'26 Thus,
for example, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati127 the issue was the consti-
tutionality of a city ordinance that prohibited the assembly of three or
more persons who "conduct themselves in a manner annoying to per-
sons passing by. . . ." ' The Ohio Supreme Court had defined the
statutory term to mean "to trouble, to vex, to impede, to incommode, to
provoke, to harass or to irritate."' 29 The United States Supreme Court
had no difficulty in pinpointing the constitutional infirmity in the ordi-
nance: "Our decisions establish that mere public intolerance or ani-
mosity cannot be the basis for abridgment of these constitutional
125. Id. at 4-5.
126. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
127. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
128. Id. (quoting CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 901-L6 (1956)) (emphasis ad-
ded),
129. Id. at 612 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Coates, 21 Ohio St. 2d 66, 69, 255 N.E.2d 247,
249 (1970)).
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freedoms."' 3
This distinction was drawn with even greater clarity in Cohen.
Defining fighting words as "those personally abusive epithets which
. .. are .. . inherently likely to provoke violent reaction,"", the
Supreme Court found the rationale of the lower court "plainly untena-
ble" because "[a]t most it reflect[ed] an 'undifferentiated fear or appre-
hension of disturbance [which] is not enough to overcome the right to
freedom of expression.' "32 In Lucas v. Arkansas'33 the statute, which
the appellants were convicted of violating, proscribed speech that
would "arouse to anger" the recipient. There was substantial evidence
that the words used by the appellants would ordinarily have such an
effect.' 34 Although the dissenters claimed to be "at a loss to understand
what this Court further requires in a narrowing interpretation" of the
fighting words doctrine,1 35 the answer had long been clear to the
Supreme Court, which summarily vacated the conviction in Lucas. 36
The proper standard has also been clear to many lower courts.137
Thus, for example, reversing the conviction of an individual who fool-
ishly referred to two police officers as "big shits," the Alabama court of
criminal appeals in Skelton v. City of Birmingham 38 concisely summa-
rized the controlling legal principle in its effort to place a constitutional
construction on a local fighting words ordinance: "In short, the statute
requires that the words be calculated to cause an immediate breach of
the peace. It is not enough if they merely arouse anger or resent-
ment."1
3 9
It is also well established that the Supreme Court will stringently
130. Id. at 615.
131. 403 U.S. at 20.
132. Id. at 23 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
508 (1969)). See also Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 905 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("Perhaps appellant's language did not constitute 'fighting words' .... While most of those
attending the school board meeting were undoubtedly outraged and offended, the good taste and
restraint of such an audience may have made it unlikely that physical violence would result.");
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 198 (1966) (statute prohibiting "any writing calculated to create
distfirbances of the peace" held unconstitutional).
133. 416 U.S. 919 (1974).
134. Id. at 919-20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 919.
137. See, e.g., Hammond v. Adkisson, 536 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1976); In re S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d
412 (Minn. 1978); State v. Authelet, 385 A.2d 642 (R.I. 1978).
138. 342 So. 2d 933 (Ala. Crim. App.), modfedandaf'd, 342 So. 2d 937 (Ala. 1976).
139. Id. at 937.
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evaluate the words spoken, and the circumstances in which they are
uttered, to determine whether a substantial likelihood of an immediate
violent response actually exists. Indeed, the Court has reversed several
fighting words convictions precisely because the evidence disclosed that
such a probability of reflexive violence was lacking.141 Perhaps the best
illustration of the proper operation of this requirement is the Supreme
Court's finding that the Georgia opprobrious words statute was uncon-
stitutionally overbroad:
Suppose that one, at a safe distance and out of hearing of any other
than the person to whom he spoke, addressed such language to one
locked in a prison cell or on the opposite bank of an impassable torrent,
and hence without power to respond immediately to such verbal insults
by physical retaliation .... 141
In the Supreme Court's view, the censorship of the offending language
could not be justified in either of these situations simply because there
was no danger of an immediate violent response. 42 Thus, the question
of whether the offending language constitutes unprotected fighting
words requires an analysis not only of the words themselves, but also of
several other facts "such as the relation of the parties, the circumstances
under which the language was used, and the manner of the speaker."' 143
The requirement of substantial likelihood of a reflexive violent re-
sponse is now firmly established. The more subtle issue today is
whether courts should apply an objective or a subjective test to deter-
mine whether the requisite danger of an immediate violent reaction by
the addressee exists. The lower courts are seriously divided on this
question of whether the constitutional touchstone should be the antici-
pated response of the average or of the particular addressee.'" Fur-
ther, several commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court
140. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564
(1970); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
141. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. at 526 (quoting Elmore v. State, 15 Ga. App. 461,461-63, 83
S.E. 799, 799-800 (1914)). The Georgia court of appeals had cited these examples as situations
where the opprobrious words statute would proscribe the speech. In contrast, the United States
Supreme Court cited these possible applications of the Georgia statute as evidence of its unconsti-
tutional overbreadth. Id. at 525-26,
142. Id. at 525-26, 528.
143. Meyers v. State, 253 Ark. 38, 41-42, 484 S.W.2d 334, 337 (1972).
144. Cases that seemingly adopt the objective test focusing on the anticipated response of the
average addressee include Anniskette v. State, 489 P.2d 1012 (Alaska 1971); Meyers v. State, 253
Ark. 38, 484 S.W.2d 334 (1972); Clanton v. State, 357 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Bolden
v. State, 148 Ga. App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165 (1978); Bale v. Ryder, 290 A.2d 359 (Me. 1971); In re
S.LJ., 263 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978); State v. Boss, 195 Neb. 467, 238 N.W.2d 639 (1976); City of
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recently repudiated the objective standard of the average addressee and
now requires a substantial threat of violence by the particular ad-
dressee before offensive language can be deemed unprotected fighting
words.1 45 Indeed, Professor Shea has argued that adoption of a subjec-
tive test is responsible for the Court's habitual reversal of fighting
words convictions and that only a return to an objective standard will
suffice to allow the doctrine to remain a viable instrument for the cen-
sorship of unseemly expression. 46
Careful analysis demonstrates that the Supreme Court consistently
adheres to the objective standard, a test that, if properly applied, is sur-
prisingly speech protective. The Court first committed itself to the
objective fighting words test in Chaplinsky when it endorsed the con-
struction given the statute by the state court: "The word 'offensive' is
not to be defined in terms of what a particular addressee thinks ...
The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would
be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight."' 147 Since
Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the objective
standard. 148 In Ashton v. Kentucky149 the Court held that the departure
from the objective standard was reversible error because "[ilt involves
calculations as to the boiling point of a particular person or a particular
group."1 5 o
Those commentators who suggest that the Court recently adopted a
subjective standard focusing on the reaction of the particular addressee
seek support for their view in the Cohen and Gooding opinions.,
Such an interpretation of these opinions, however, is extremely dubi-
Cincinnati v. Karlan, 39 Ohio St. 2d 107, 314 N.E.2d 162 (1974); State v. Authelet, 385 A.2d 542
(R.I. 1978).
Cases that appear to adopt a subjective standard include: Harbin v. State, 358 So. 2d 856 (Fla,
Dist. Ct. App. 1978); City of Chicago v. Blackmore, 15 I11. App. 3d 994, 305 N.E.2d 687 (1973);
Downs v. State, 278 Md. 610, 366 A.2d 41 (1976); State v. Profaci, 56 N.J. 346, 266 A.2d 579
(1970); Garvey v. State, 537 S.W.2d 709 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975); Lane v. Collins, 29 Wis.2d 66,
138 N.W.2d 264 (1965).
145. See, e.g., J. BARRON & C. DIENES, sUpra note 28, at 72-73; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 28, at 793; L. TRIBE, sufpra note 23, at 618; Shea, supra note 24, at 14-22.
146. See Shea, supra note 24, at 14-24.
147. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 573 (quoting 91 N.H. at 320, 18 A.2d at 762).
148. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. at 523; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 20;
Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. at 567; Street v. New York, 394 U.S. at 592.
149. 384 U.S. 195 (1966).
150. Id. at 200. See also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614-15 (1971).
151. See, e.g., J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 28, at 72-73; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 28, at 793; L. TRIBE, supra note 23, at 618; Shea, supra note 24, at 14-22.
[Vol. 58:531
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss3/6
FIGHTING WORDS
ous. In Cohen the Court explicitly embraced the objective standard in
its brief summary of the required elements of the fighting words doc-
trine.'52 The only reason to suspect any deviation from the traditional
test is the Court's observation that there was "no showing that anyone
who saw Cohen was in fact violently aroused,"' 5 3 and that there was
"'no evidence that substantial numbers of citizens are standing ready to
strike out physically" in response to Cohen's jacket.'54 Neither obser-
vation necessarily contemplates the adoption of a subjective test of
fighting words. As a practical matter, although the fact that a particu-
lar addressee fails to respond violently cannot be conclusive on the is-
sue of whether an ordinary, reasonable addressee would so react, 5- the
failure of a substantial number of persons to respond violently is at
least evidence that the ordinary reasonable person would not react vio-
lently. This rationale is consistent with the Supreme Court's emphatic
conclusion that the constitutional standard must be the ordinary, law-
abiding citizen and not "some persons. . with. . . lawless and vio-
lent proclivities. '56
The argument that the Supreme Court abandoned the objective stan-
dard in Gooding is no more persuasive. Again the Court specifically
endorsed the Chaplinsky test focusing on the average addressee 57 and,
further, cited the Ashton holding with approval.'58 The clue to the sup-
posed adoption of a subjective test relied upon by the commentators is
the Court's statement that the constitutional flaw in the Georgia statute,
as construed by the state courts, was that it was not limited to words
that "have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to
whom, individually, the remark is addressed."' 5 9 This statement, how-
ever, was a direct quotation from Chaplinsky.'60 It strains credibility to
suggest that the Supreme Court intended to overrule a central principle
of Chaplinsky by a mere favorable quotation from that very case.' 6 1
152. 403 U.S. at 20.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 24.
155. See, e.g., Hammond v. State, 255 Ark. 56, 498 SW.2d 652 (1973); Bolden v. State, 148
Ga. App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165 (1978); State v. Authelet, 385 A.2d 642 (R.I. 1978) Contra, People v.
Douglas, 29 Ill. App. 3d 738, 331 N.E.2d 359 (1975).
156. 403 U.S. at 24.
157. 405 U.S. at 523.
158. Id. at 527.
159. Id. at 524.
160. See 315 U.S. at 573 (quoting 91 N.H. at 313, 18 A.2d at 758).
161. The Court's statement that the statute which was capable of application where "there was
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The more reasonable interpretation of both Chaplinsky and Gooding is
that the Court was attempting, rather inartistically, to state two sepa-
rate elements of the fighting words doctrine: first, that the offensive
language must be addressed individually to the person of the hearer;
and second, that the words must be likely to cause the ordinary reason-
able person in the circumstances of the addressee to react violently.
This entire objective-subjective debate focuses on whether the ordi-
nary addressee test should be applied when the target of the offensive
words is a police officer. 162 In Gooding the addressees were police of-
ficers and the Supreme Court suggested that this would have been a
relevant issue if the case had not been disposed of on overbreadth
grounds. 63 Three months later Justice Powell suggested that the Court
should apply a separate standard when the recipient is a police officer:
If these words had been addressed by one citizen to another, face to
face and in a hostile manner, I would have no doubt that they would be
"fighting words." But the situation may be different where such words
are addressed to a police officer trained to exercise a higher degree of
restraint than the average citizen.
164
Because the fighting words doctrine is premised upon a perceived
danger of breach of the peace, Justice Powell's suggestion has a great
deal of merit. A police officer takes an oath of office to maintain the
public peace and assumes a public obligation to keep, not breach, the
peace. In addition, police officers are frequently confronted with
coarse language and harsh epithets and quickly gain experience in cop-
ing peaceably with angry citizens. They receive special sensitivity and
public relations training in how to reduce community tensions and re-
solve such situations in a nonviolent fashion. 65 Under these circum-
stances several courts, which have addressed the issue of why
personally abusive epithets directed at a police officer should be pun-
ishable, have not relied on the governmental interest in protecting the
public peace, but have premised their opinion on the governmental in-
no likelihood that the person addressed would make an immediate violent response" was over-
broad because it was not limited to "'fighting' words defined by Chaplinskj' is equally ambigu-
ous. See 405 U.S. at 528.
162. In each of the cases cited at note 144, supra, the addressee was a police officer.
163. 405 U.S. at 519-20 n.1, 526.
164. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972), citing MODEL PENAL CODE 250.1,
Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
165. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1, Comment 4(c) at 14 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
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terest in promoting respect for law enforcement officials.166
The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly ruled this governmen-
tal interest impermissible as a justification for the censorship of abusive
language. 67 Protecting the addressee from expressions of disrespect is
particularly suspect when the addressee is a governmental official, such
as a police officer. One of the most serious flaws of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Chaplinsky was its failure to explore the relationship
between the punishment of disrespectful words directed at a police of-
ficer and the constitutionally disreputable crime of seditious libel. 168
Placing aside the constitutionally impermissible desire to promote re-
spect for the police, even the most abusive epithet will not be likely to
cause a police officer, trained to keep the peace, to react violently.1 69
It would be inappropriate, however, to equate the adoption of a spe-
cial standard to deal with the problem of the police officer-recipient
with the adoption of a subjective fighting words test. In Gooding the
Supreme Court suggested that a special standard would be applied in
this situation when it condemned the following state court opinion:
"[T]he use of language of this character is a violation of the statute,
even though it be addressed to one who, on account of circumstances or
by virtue of the obligations of office, can not actually then and there
resent the same by a breach of the peace .... ."110
Logically, the oath, experience, training, and obligations of police
166. See, e.g., Lucas v. State, 254 Ark. 584, 494 S.W.2d 705 (1973), vacated and remanded,
Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974); City of Saint Paul v. Morris, 258 Minn. 467, 104 N.W.2d
902 (1960); People v. Fenton, 102 Misc. 43, 168 N.Y.S. 725 (1917).
167. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
168. See Rutzick, supra note 120, at 9-11. See also City of New Orleans v. Lewis, 263 La. 809,
269 So. 2d 450 (1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 130 (1974), wherein Justice Tate, dissenting, observed:
The police, our front line soldiers in the battle against crime, deserve the respect and
support of our officials and citizens. Nevertheless, ever since this nation fought for and
obtained its freedom, it has not been a crime to curse or use opprobrious language about
the public officers of our democratic republic. If, for instance, the present ordinance had
made it a crime wantonly to curse or revile members of the United States Supreme Court
or of the state judiciary (or the Governor, or the legislators or any other public officer or
servant), as well as the police, I am certain that not one of the majority would deem such
an enactment constitutional. The right to criticize our public officers, be they judges or
policemen, has, since our earliest days, been deemed a basic right of all Americans. The
harshness or unfairness of language used in such critical commentary does not remove it
from the protection of our constitution.
id. at 835, 269 So. 2d at 459-60. See atso New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
169. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. at 526; People v. Lukowsky, 94 Misc. 500, 159 N.Y.S.
599 (1916).
170. 405 U.S. at 526 (quoting Elmore v. State, 15 Ga. App. 461, 461-63, 83 S.E. 799, 799-800
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officers can be treated as a factual circumstance to be considered in the
application of an objective fighting words test. On the other hand, it is
equally logical to treat the question of a special standard for police not
as a choice between an objective or subjective test, but rather as an
issue of the generality of application of the objective test. In other
words, it is certainly consistent with an objective test to apply a more
specific standard of "the ordinary reasonable police officer"'' in ap-
propriate situations. Indeed, the adoption of a standard of the ordinary
reasonable professional has never been deemed inconsistent with an
objective standard of liability.'72 Presently, the Supreme Court re-
quires that the offending language be likely to cause an immediate vio-
lent response by an average addressee to be constitutionally
punishable. Even if the Court does adopt a special standard for police
officers there is no reason to believe that the Court has abandoned an
objective test to measure the likelihood of such a violent response.
The third element of the fighting words doctrine requires the speaker
to utter the offending words face-to-face to the recipient. This element
compliments the requirement that there must be a likelihood of an im-
mediate violent reaction by specifying one objective circumstance that
must exist before it is reasonable to assume that such a danger is pres-
ent. Although the Supreme Court has consistently enunciated this re-
quirement, 173 it has not yet had an occasion to explicitly apply it.
Several state court opinions, however, are illustrative of the proper ap-
plication of this element. At a minimum, this element requires that the
words must be used in the physical presence of the addressee.' 74
In Anniskette v. State"'75 the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed disor-
derly conduct and disturbing the peace convictions of the defendant
(1914)). In Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. at 132-33 n.2, the Supreme Court suggested
that the question of a special standard for police officers was still open.
171. People v. Benders, 63 Misc. 2d 572, 575, 312 N.Y.S.2d 603, 608-09 (1970).
172. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 161-66 (4th ed., 1971); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 289, Comment m (1965); Seavey, Negligence-Subjeclive or Objec-
tive, 41 H,.nv. L. Rnv. (1927). Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1, Comment 44 (Tent. Draft No.
13, 1961 (Policeman "would have to be more than human to take the same detached and tolerant
view of insults loudly addressed to himself as he might take toward two strangers belaboring each
other verbally." Id.).
173. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Gooding
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 658 (1942).
174. See, e.g., Anniskette v. State, 489 P.2d 1012 (Alaska 1971); State v. Oliveira, 115 N.H.
559, 347 A.2d 165 (1975).
175. 489 P.2d 1012 (Alaska 1971).
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who repeatedly telephoned the home of the state trooper late at night
and berated him with abusive language.' 7 6 Assuming that defendant's
language constituted fighting words, the court held that telephonic
communications fall outside the category of face-to-face utterances be-
cause "[tihe time necessary for the officer to travel from his residence to
that of the defendant should have allowed enough cooling off so that
any desire on the part of the officer to inflict violence on the defendant
should have been dissipated."' 77
Moreover, the face-to-face element is not satisfied by mere technical
physical presence, but contemplates an extremely close physical prox-
imity. The cases suggest that this element is not present when the ad-
dressee has to give chase to inflict bodily injury upon the speaker.
Thus, Garvey v. State'78 held that the face-to-face requirement was not
met when the defendant, driving past a police station, shouted "sooey"
at a police officer. 179 In In re S.L.J "I a fourteen year old girl was
stopped by two police officers and instructed to hurry home because it
was past curfew. She started away and then turned and, from a dis-
tance of fifteen to thirty feet from the officers, shouted, "Fuck you
pigs."18' The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the girl's convic-
tion for disorderly conduct, reasoning: "With the words spoken in re-
treat from more than fifteen feet away rather than eye-to-eye, there was
no reasonable likelihood that they would tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace . ,,182
The final element of the fighting words doctrine enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court requires that the offending language be
"directed to the person of the hearer."' 83 Some commentators have
been confused by the Court's alternate phrasing of this element that the
unseemly words must "have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence
by the person to whom, individually, tht remark is addressed,"' 84 and
have erroneously concluded that, rather than stating a separate ele-
176. Id. at 1013.
177. Id. at 1014-15.
178. 537 S.W.2d 709 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
179, Id. at 710.
180. 263 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978).
181. Idat 415.
182. Id at 420.
183. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 20 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. at 309).
184. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. at 523 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at
573).
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ment, the Court was adopting a subjective test of the probability of a
violent response. 185 As previously demonstrated, however, the Court
consistently adheres to an objective test of reflexive violence.18 6 In ad-
dition, the fighting words doctrine requires that the words must be de-
scriptive of a particular individual and addressed to that individual.
Following the mandate of the Supreme Court, several state courts rec-
ognized this separate element of the doctrine; at the same time, these
courts adopted an objective standard to test the likelihood of a violent
reaction. 18 7
In Hess v. Indiana188 the Supreme Court explicitly invoked this re-
quirement of the fighting words doctrine as a justification for reversing
a conviction for disorderly conduct. Hess, a participant in an antiwar
demonstration on the campus of Indiana University, was convicted for
his statement, "We'll take the fucking street later (or again)."' 8 9 In a
per curiam opinion, the Court rejected the argument that this language
constituted unprotected fighting words:
Even if under other circumstances this language could be regarded as a
personal insult, the evidence is undisputed that Hess' statement was not
directed to any person or group in particular. Although the sheriff testi-
fied that he was offended by the language, he also stated that he did not
interpret the expression as being directed personally at him, and the evi-
dence is clear that appellant had his back to the sheriff at the time. Thus,
under our decisions, the State could not punish this speech as "fighting
words."1 90
Sipilarly, in Eaton v. City of Tulsa'9' the Court reversed the criminal
contempt conviction of the petitioner who during testimony referred to
his alleged assailant as "chicken shit."'192 The Court, in its per curiam
opinion, pointedly noted that the offending words were "not directed at
the judge."' 93
The state courts have followed the Supreme Court in relying on the
185. See Rabinowitz, supra note 29, at 266; Shea, supra note 24.
186. See notes 147-61 supra.
187. See, e.g., Clanton v. State, 357 So. 2d 455 (Fla. App. 1978); State v. Boss, 195 Neb. 467,
238 N.W.2d 639 (1976); City of Kent v. Kelley, 44 Ohio St. 2d 43, 337 N.E.2d 788 (1975); State v.
Authelet, 385 A.2d 642 (R.I. 1978).
188. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
189. Id. at 107.
190. Id. at 107-08.
191. 415 U.S. 697 (1974).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 698.
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requirement that the offensive words must be descriptive of a particular
person and addressed to that person as grounds for the reversal of fight-
ing words convictions. Thus, the court of appeals of California found
that defendant's use of the word "motherfuckers" did not constitute
unprotected fighting words where there was no evidence "to show that
the epithet or expletive mouthed by the petitioner was directed at any-
one."'194 In State v. Authelet 9 5 a police officer was called to investigate
a complaint of rowdyism by a group of youths who would run into
nearby woods whenever police approached the scene. The arresting
officer waited in the woods while other police approached from another
direction and overheard the defendant shout to his companions, "Here
come the god damn fucking pigs again."' 96 Reversing the conviction,
the court relied on the fact that the statement was not directed to the
arresting officer.'9 7 Similarly, in Downs v. State98 the disorderly con-
duct conviction of a defendant who stated to friends in a restaurant,
"the fucking niggers in the County are not better than goddam police-
men," was reversed because "[tihere was no direct evidence that it was
spoken to anyone other than the persons sitting in the booth with
Downs."'1 9 9
As important as the final element has been in the application of the
fighting words doctrine, it would seem that, as applied in the foregoing
cases, it is really just another way of stating the separate requirements
that the words must constitute a personally abusive epithet and must be
addressed in a face-to-face manner to the object of the epithet. There
is, however, another possible application of this final element which
would serve a unique function. Returning to the Court's language that
the unseemly words must be likely to cause a reflexive violent response
"by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed," 2" it is
apparent that this requirement could be interpreted to clearly distin-
guish the fighting words doctrine from the hostile audience doctrine.
Thus, when offensive words are addressed to an individual, the fighting
words analysis would be applied, but when addressed to a group, the
194. Jefferson v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 721, 726, 124 Cal. Rptr. 507, 509 (1975).
195. 385 A.2d 642 (R.I. 1978).
196. Id. at 643.
197. Id. at 650.
198. 278 Md. 610, 366 A.2d 41 (1976).
199. Id. at 618, 366 A.2d at 46.
200. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. at 523 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at
573) (emphasis added).
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hostile audience doctrine would be appropriate. Distinguishing be-
tween the circumstances when these doctrines should be applied is par-
ticularly important. Although both are designed to cope with the
problem of audience violence directed against a speaker, the hostile
audience doctrine is applicable whenever there is a real and substantial
threat of audience violence against the speaker without regard to the
nature of the language used by him.20 1 On the other hand, the hostile
audience doctrine requires the police to exert every reasonable effort to
protect the speaker from the violent crowd and permits the arrest of the
speaker as a last resort when police protection would no longer be ef-
fective.20 2
This interpretation of the final element of the fighting words doctrine
is consistent with the Court's original fighting words decision. In
Chaplinsky the words that formed the basis for the conviction were ad-
dressed to a single individual, the City Marshal. Whepi the Court later
cited Chaplinsky as support for the affirmance of a group libel convic-
tion in Beauharnais v. Illinois, °3 Justice Black, a member of the
Chaplinsky Court, vigorously dissented:
The Court's reliance on Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire ... is also mis-
placed. New Hampshire had a state law making it an offense to direct
insulting words at an individual on a public street. Chaplinsky had vio-
lated that law by calling a man vile names "face-to-face." We pointed out
in that context that the use of such "fighting" words was not an essential
part of exposition of ideas. Whether the words used in their context here
are "fighting" words in the same sense is doubtful, but whether so or not
they are not addressed to or about individuals.2°4
As the federal district court recognized in Collin v. Smith,2 °5 the ra-
tionale for Justice Black's sharp limitation of the fighting words doc-
trine remains valid today. Many public policies have a differential
impact on identifiable groups of people, and individuals speaking on
the merits or demerits of such policies often become intemperate in
their language. Clearly, the failure to limit the fighting words doctrine
201. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
202. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1963); Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. at 326-27 (Black, J., dissenting); Wolin v. Port Authority of New York, 392 F.2d 83 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
203. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
204. Id. at 272 (Black, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original).
205. 447 F. Supp. 676, 690-91 (N.D. Ill.), af'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
916 (1978).
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could have a serious chilling effect on such political expression.2"6 Fur-
thermore, from the perspective of the government's interest in prevent-
ing breaches of the peace, there is much merit in Justice Jackson's
observation that "whether one may be the cause of mob violence by his
own personification or advocacy of ideas which a crowd already fears
and hates, is not to be solved merely by going through a transcript of
the speech to pick out 'fighting words.' "207
Cohen v. California can certainly be read to support this distinction
between the fighting words and hostile audience doctrines. The
message on the back of Cohen's jacket was addressed indiscriminately
to all passersby who happened to see it. The Supreme Court explic-
itly noted that it was not addressed to any particular individual,2" 8 thus
rejecting the holding of the California court that the fighting words
doctrine was applicable to a statement made to a large group. This
interpretation of Cohen was apparently accepted by the Court in Rosen-
feld v. New Jersey.2" 9 Rosenfeld was convicted for a speech he made at
a local school board meeting in which he used the word "motherfuck-
ing" on four occasions to describe teachers, the local school board, the
town, and the nation.210 The Court summarily vacated the conviction
and remanded the conviction for reconsideration in light of Cohen and
Gooding.2" Even the dissenters recognized that the traditional ele-
ments of the fighting words doctrine were not present since "the offen-
sive words were not directed at a specific individual. 212
Thus the Supreme Court, through the process of case-by-case adjudi-
cation, has developed an astonishingly consistent body of precedent
that clearly enunciates the essential elements of the fighting words doc-
trine. The offending language (1) must constitute a personally abusive
epithet, (2) must be addressed in a face-to-face manner, (3) must be
directed to a specific individual and be descriptive of that individual,
and (4) must be uttered under such circumstances that the words would
have a direct tendency to cause an immediate violent response by the
average recipient. If any of these four elements is absent, the doctrine
206. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. at 273-75 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 286-87 (Doug-
las, J., dissenting).
207. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 35 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
208. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 20.
209. 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
210. Id. at 904 (Powell, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 901-02.
212. Id. at 905 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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may not justifiably be invoked as a rationale for the suppression of the
expression.
III. FIGHTING WORDS AS FREE SPEECH: TOWARD JUDICIAL
PROTECTION FOR UNSEEMLY INSULTS
Contrary to the argument of several commentators, 1 3 it is neither
fortuitous nor a sign of doctrinal confusion that the Supreme Court has
upheld only one conviction for the use of fighting words in its history.
The doctrine is explicitly designed to be applicable only in those ex-
tremely rare circumstances when offensive personal insults present a
substantial probability of causing a breach of the public peace by the
addressee. Indeed, it is indicative of the infrequency with which situa-
tions involving a proper application of the fighting words doctrine arise
that Chaplinsky, the only case affirming such a conviction, itself repre-
sents at best a dubious invocation of the legal principle it announced.
In light of the Supreme Court's clear exposition of the required ele-
ments of the doctrine, generally conscientious application of it, and
consistent reversal of improper fighting words convictions, it would ap-
pear on first impression that the fighting words problem is a relatively
minor one in the universe of first amendment concerns. Unfortunately,
the view that the problem has been favorably resolved is the product of
a myopic preoccupation with cases decided by the Supreme Court. The
status of the fighting words doctrine in the state courts is dramatically
different. At this level of the judicial system one finds an extraordinary
number of cases invoking the doctrine and, in the words of Justice
Douglas, "State Courts. . . have consistently shown either inability or
unwillingess to apply its teaching. 214
The sheer number of fighting words cases litigated at the state appel-
late court level would not be as alarming if, as one commentator has
suggested, the doctrine was being invoked to protect the aged and in-
firm from "the vilest personal verbal abuse. '215 This, however, is a ro-
mantic vision that exists only in the imagination of a law professor.
Common sense suggests that a complaint by a private individual that
he has been the victim of a personally abusive insult by another private
individual is extremely unlikely to elicit any meaningful police re-
213. See note 29 supra.
214. Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, 416 U.S. 924, 928 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
215. Shea, supra note 24, at 22.
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sponse. Indeed, one searches case law in vain to find decisions where
such complaints resulted in criminal prosecution. Instead, the doctrine
is invoked almost uniformly in circumstances in which its application is
wholly inappropriate, such as when the speaker is discussing issues of
political or societal importance or addressing a police officer trained in
self-restraint.21 6 Moreover, the vision of the speaker as an unmitigated
bully engaging in a totally unjustifiable verbal assault upon a hapless
victim is equally erroneous. Most cases involve speakers who under-
standably lose their self-control momentarily when addressing issues of
public importance or when subjected to unusual emotional stress. Ju-
venile behavior by youths also plays a prominent role in the reported
decisions.21 7
Justice Brandeis suggested that expression cannot be suppressed by
governmental censorship, "unless the evil apprehended is relatively se-
rious."21 To observe that state courts misapply the fighting words doc-
trine, it is unnecessary to argue, in the abstract, against the existence of
an important governmental interest in preventing breaches of the
peace. State courts typically apply the fighting words doctrine in situa-
tions in which the danger of a violent reaction to the speaker's language
is remote and the grievance being asserted against the speech is decid-
edly trivial. Fenton v. Stear,1 9 one of the few reported cases in which
the addressee was not a police officer, is illustrative. In Fenton, a high
school student was sitting in a parked automobile in a shopping center
one evening. One of his teachers passed by in another automobile.
When a companion noted the teacher's presence, the student replied,
"He's a prick." The teacher, who overheard the remark, confirmed the
student's character assessment by instituting disciplinary proceedings
that resulted in the student's suspension from school.2z° The suspen-
sion was judicially upheld on the grounds that the remark constituted
unprotected fighting words, despite the court's strong implication that
the reasonable person would have ignored it.z"' Incredibly, the court
relied on the fact that the offending words would be deemed de
minimis by a state civil or criminal court as a rationale for upholding
216. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1976); In re S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412
(Minn. 1978); State v. Authelet, 385 A.2d 642 (R.I. 1978).
218. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, J.J., concurring).
219. 423 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
220. Id. at 769.
221. Id. at 771.
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the punishment imposed on the student.22
Turning to the vast bulk of fighting words cases, which involve lan-
guage directed at police officers, the problem of consistent misapplica-
tion of the doctrine to inappropriate and trivial cases is compounded by
the intractable danger of discretionary and selective enforcement by
law enforcement officials:
In arrests for the more common street crimes (e.g., robbery, assault, disor-
derly conduct, resisting arrest), it is usually unnecessary that the person
also be charged with the less serious offense of addressing obscene words
to the officer. The present type of ordinance tends to be invoked only
where there is no other valid basis for arresting an objectionable or suspi-
cious person. The opportunity for abuse, especially where a statute has
received a virtually open-ended interpretation, is self-evident.223
Many commentators have recognized that this problem of discrimi-
natory enforcement is particularly acute in the fighting words con-
text.224 The danger is not simply that the penal law will be selectively
invoked against members of racial or other minority groups and speak-
ers who espouse ideological views unpopular with enforcement offi-
cials, although this danger is very real.225 The more prevalent danger is
that police will use this unfettered discretionary authority to punish
trivial expressions of disrespect and sincere allegations of official mis-
conduct. The normal expectation would be that few such cases would
be reported if for no other reason than the propensity of police to use
the arrest power as a sanction and not pursue the criminal prosecution:
Arrest for disorderly conduct usually is not synonymous with "invoking
the criminal process" but is synonymous with imposing punishment-that
of being detained, having to go to the station, having to put up bail or to
stay in jail, and having to appear in court or forfeit the bail money. Most
arrests for disorderly conduct involve an abuse of power by the arresting
officer, as most of the officers we have interviewed readily acknowledge.
222. Id.
223. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. at 136 (Powell, J., concurring).
224. See, eg., MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961); K. DAvis,
POLICE DISCRETION 14-16, 145-46 (1975); Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the
Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police
Officers, and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205 (1967); Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the
Criminal Process. Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543
(1960).
225. See, e.g., Haiman, Speech v. Privacy. Is There a Right Not to Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw.
U.L. Rav. 153, 191-92 (1972); Rutzick, supra note 120, at 28; Note, "Offensive Language"and the
FirstAmendment, 53 B.U.L. REv. 834, 857 & an. 184-85 (1973).
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Some of them even take the initiative to boast about how effectively they
use the disorderly conduct statute.
The Supreme Court of the United States in a line of unanimous deci-
sions has held that words alone may not constitutionally be an offense
unless they are fighting words, but the effective law in Chicago often is
that verbal defiance of an officer, without fighting words, is usually pun-
ished by an arrest. The police make the effective law on such a subject;
the Supreme Court's version of the law is merely some words in a
book.226
Suprisingly, the reported cases reflect these abuses. Many involve
grievances which are trivial at best. For example, in People v. Smith2 27
a police officer in an unmarked car looked back after narrowly avoid-
ing a collision and saw the driver of the other auto extend his finger
upward in a universally understood gesture and move his lips in what
the officer believed to be an obscene utterance. 228 The state court of
appeals reversed the defendant's conviction, noting that his conduct,
although perhaps immature, "was a spontaneous reaction to a sudden
emergency which commonly occurs every day. '229 The appalling fact
is that the defendant was forced to bear the burden of protracted litiga-
tion before a court recognized that "[i]n such minor stress circum-
stances, many drivers utter profane words-a normal reaction in
everyday traffic congestion. 2 a°
Unfortunately, the original conviction in Smith is not an aberration.
Another case involved a defendant who asked a police officer who had
stopped him for a routine traffic check, "What the fuck are you bother-
ing me for?"23' Similarly, in Clanton v. State, the allegedly unprotected
fighting words constituted a complaint that a police officer attempting
to search an auto during a routine stop lacked a "Goddam search war-
rant." '232 Such arrests for unseemly language are not always the result
226. K. DAvis, supra note 224, at 15.
227. 79 Mich. App. 757, 262 N.W.2d 900 (1977).
228. Id. at 759, 262 N.W.2d at 901.
229. Id. at 762, 262 N.W.2d at 903.
230. Id. (emphasis added).
231. State v. Profaci, 56 NJ. 346, 348, 266 A.2d 579, 581 (1970). See also Lewis v. City of
New Orleans, 415 U.S. at 131 n.I (Mother said to police officer arresting her young son: "you god
damn m.f. police-I am going to [the Superintendent of Police] about this"); State v. Reed, 56 N.J.
354, 356, 266 A.2d 584, 585 (1970) (Defendant stated to police officer who intervened in non-
violent commercial dispute: "[Who the hell do you think you are? . . . Jesus Christ. I don't give
a God damn who the hell you are.").
232. 357 So. 2d 455, 456 (Fla. App. 1978). See also Reese v. State, 17 Md. App. 73, 77, 299
A.2d 848, 852 (1973) (Auxiliary police officer overheard defendant say to companion that he "did
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of spontaneous police decisions. In Waller v. City of St. Petersburg,33
the officers were on routine patrol when they heard the defendant shout
"Pig" at them. They arranged a meeting with their lieutenant several
blocks away where they decided to return to the scene and arrest the
defendant if he repeated the insult because "[w]e were losing quite a bit
of face there on 22nd Street." 34 Ultimately, the defendant's conviction
was affirmed on the ground that when the police attempted to effectu-
ate the arrest, allegedly by the use of excessive force, a riot almost
broke out among bystanders. 35
Waller is indicative of a large number of cases in which the facts are
hotly disputed: the defendant is either guilty of the use of fighting
words or the unfortunate victim of unprovoked police misconduct.236
For example, in Williams v. District of Columbia"7 the defendant and
four friends were standing in front of a laundromat managed by the
defendant when a police officer ordered them to move because they
were allegedly blocking the flow of pedestrian traffic on the thirteen to
fourteen foot wide sidewalk.238 At the trial, which resulted in a convic-
tion ultimately reversed on appeal, a hopeless conflict arose between
the testimony of the officer, who claimed that the defendant had said,
"I dare you to lock my Goddamn ass up," and all other witnesses who
denied that the defendant had used any profane words and alleged that
he had been subjected to unprovoked police brutality.239
In Norwell v. City of Cincinnati24° a sixty-nine year old immigrant
who, without the use of any offensive language, protested a dubious
detention by a police officer, was convicted of disorderly conduct. Con-
trary to the argument of Justice Blackmun, the fact that this case had to
not want to play the fucking pinballs" because he had already lost too much money); City of Saint
Paul v. Morris, 258 Minn. 467, 468, 104 N.W.2d 902, 903 (1960) (Defendant, protesting an arrest,
said to police officer. "You white mother f-kers, what are your picking on us for, why don't you
pick on the white people?").
233. 245 So. 2d 685 (Fla. App. 1971), rev'd, City of St. Petersburg v. Waller, 261 So. 2d 151
(Fla. 1972).
234. 245 So. 2d at 685-86.
235. City of St. Petersburg v. Waller, 261 So. 2d at 153, 155.
236. See, ag., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); People v.,Douglas, 29 I11.
App. 3d 738, 331 N.E.2d 359 (1975); State v. Boss, 195 Neb. 467, 238 N.W.2d 639 (1976). See also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
237. 419 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
238. Id. at 642.
239. Id. at 642-43.
240. 414 U.S. 14 (1973).
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be litigated all the way to the United States Supreme Court before the
unjust conviction was reversed hardly inspires confidence that "[c]ourts
are capable of stemming abusive application of statutes."24
Whether or not the triviality of the fighting words problem or the
pervasive discriminatory misapplication of the governing statutes are
alone sufficient reasons for the abandonment of the fighting words doc-
trine, they are certainly considerations that justify subjecting the doc-
trine to careful scrutiny in order to determine whether it is sound as a
matter of constitutional principle.
Momentarily removing the epithetical label "fighting words," it
should be readily apparent that such expression has substantial societal
value which, absent a countervailing governmental interest of the
greatest magnitude, should entitle it to constitutional protection. Such
expression, of course, is simply offensive language which conveys one's
dislike or disrespect for the person addressed. Simply stated, the issue
presented is why, if offensive language and expressions of dislike or
disrespect for another are each entitled to the protection of the first
amendment, should the combination of the two be deemed unpro-
tected.
Expressions of dislike or disrespect for another are precisely the type
of ideological communications that are within the very core of the pro-
tection accorded by the first amendment. "[Tihe First Amendment's
basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas."242 That this advocacy
of ideas includes the notion that another's behavior is disgraceful or
distasteful to the speaker should not lessen its protected status. 243 In-
deed, if the addressee is a public official, such as a police officer, the
critical speech falls within the category of seditious libel and is entitled
to the greatest constitutional protection.244 Although criticism annoys
the recipient, such annoyance cannot justify censorship. Rather, it is a
reason for affording first amendment protection.245
The Supreme Court has also established that offensive language is
241. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. at 142 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing
Norwell as a favorable example of courts conscientiously preventing misuse of the fighting words
doctrine).
242. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959).
243. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518 (1972).
244. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Kalven, supra note 65.
245. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978); Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
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entitled to constitutional protection.' 6 Simply stated, it is a fundamen-
tal constitutional principle that "communication need not meet stan-
dards of acceptability. ' ' 247 The rationale for this principle is not merely
the common sense view that rather trivial considerations of etiquette
should not be used as an excuse for the censorship of serious ideologi-
cal speech. The Court broadened the rationale by recognizing that
"words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive
force."248 The particular words chosen by the speaker are important in
conveying the depth of the speaker's concern about the topic under dis-
cussion. "For example, it can hardly be maintained that phrases like,
'Repeal the Draft,' 'Resist the Draft,' or 'The Draft Must Go' convey
essentially the same message as 'Fuck the Draft.' Clearly something is
lost in the translation." 249
Equally important, "[elmotions sway speakers and audiences alike.
Intemperate speech is a distinctive characteristic of man. '250 If we, as a
nation, wish to maintain our proud heritage of recognizing that expres-
sion should be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" we must accept
the human reality that it will often "include vehement, caustic and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi-
cials." 251 The first amendment recognizes the human frailty of people
and accepts the fact that speakers, momentarily caught in the passion
of the ideological message they espouse, occasionally lose their self-
control and breach the societal norms of propriety in language. "But
the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in
spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the
long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the
part of the citizens of a democracy."252
There are also sound pragmatic reasons why the first amendment
246. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Papish v. Board of Curators,
410 U.S. 667 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). But e.FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
438 U.S. 726 (1978) (offensive language may be proscribed on the electronic media due to the
presence of children and captive audiences).
247. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
248. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 26.
249. Haiman, supra note 225, at 189.
250. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 286-87 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
251. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
252. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). See also Baumgartner v. United
States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944) ("[O]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right
to criticize public men and measures--and that means not only informed and responsible criticism
but the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation.").
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affords constitutional protection to offensive language. Such language,
even though unacceptable to majority attitudes, is quite common in
many subcultures in our society. 53 The danger is thus very real that
judgments based on the propriety of the words chosen by the speaker
will reflect a myopic ethnocentricity, and ultimately merely the subjec-
tive indignation of a particular judge or jury. 54 This concern, how-
ever, is but one aspect of the inherent vagueness of the entire concept of
offensive words that makes their punishment constitutionally inappro-
priate:
Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it
is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us. Yet no read-
ily ascertainable general principle exists for stopping short of that result
were we to affirm the judgment below. For, while the particular four-
letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most
others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is
another's lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental offi-
cials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution
leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.255
Interestingly, in the context of language spoken face-to-face to the
addressee, it is artificial to distinguish between words that express dis-
respect or dislike and words that are offensive. Such distasteful lan-
guage is itself a recognized and conventional manner of expressing
such attitudes toward another:
The natural inclination is to feel that if an execratory expletive is offen-
sive enough it must be illegal regardless of "technicalities." The difficulty
is that it is quite impossible to determine how offensive any particular
expression is. To begin with, curses, oaths, expletives, execrations, impre-
cations, maledictions, and the whole vocabulary of insults are not in-
tended or susceptible of literal interpretation. They are expressions of
annoyance and hostility-nothing more. To attach greater significance to
253. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 776 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Haiman, supra note 225, at 191-92; Rutzick, supra note 120, at 28; Note, supra note 225, at 854.
254. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 775 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Von Sleichter v. United States, 472 F.2d 1244, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, J., dissenting):
[Ilt is not the function of judges to decide on the basis of their own sensibilities which
words retain "shock quality" and which "are today's common idiom." No case that I
know of authorizes use of the judicial process to figuratively wash out the mouths of
criminal defendants who use language which some judge, on his own, considers "dirty"
or "offensive."
255. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 25. See also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 316
(1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe line between communications which 'offend' and those
which do not is too blurred to identify criminal conduct. It is also too blurred to delimit the
protections of the First Amendment.").
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them is stupid, ignorant, or naive. Their significance is emotional, and it
is not merely immeasurable but also variable. The emotional quality of
exclamations varies from time to time, from region to region, and as be-
tween social, cultural, and ethnic groups. The standards of verbal behav-
ior of those social groups within which judges move are not fairly
applicable to the entire population.2 56
The Supreme Court traditionally has invoked the governmental in-
terest in preserving the public peace as a rationale for censoring offen-
sive language addressed in a face-to-face manner to the object of the
speaker's dislike or disrepect. The Court apparently assumes that an
offensive word, a personally abusive epithet, will cause the ordinary,
reasonable recipient to reflexively and irresistibly react with immediate
violence.257 This assumption needs to be critically examined before it
is accepted as a justification for the censorship of speech otherwise enti-
tled to constitutional protection. Two essential premises of the fighting
words doctrine must be kept in mind in evaluating whether the sup-
posed likelihood of responsive violence is a real concern. First, the
Court has emphasized that, although the hearer may be angered by the
expression, the recipient's anger is no justification for the expression's
censorship and may, indeed, be a reason to accord it constitutional pro-
tection." 8 Thus, the fighting words doctrine is premised on the theory
that such an unseemly insult will arouse uncontrollable violence, not
merely anger, in the hearer. Second, the Supreme Court has clearly
stated that the standard for determining the likelihood of such an irre-
sistible violent reaction is the ordinary reasonable person.259 Under
this objective test, it is irrelevant that "[t]here may be some persons
about with. . . lawless and violent proclivities. '260 Thus, to justify use
of the fighting words doctrine as a means of protecting the govern-
ment's interest in preservation of the public peace, a personally abusive
256. City of St. Paul v. Morris, 258 Minn. 467,480-81, 104 N.W.2d 902, 910-11 (1960) (Loev-
inger, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). See also Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law To-
ward a Mforal Theory ofthe First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 50 (1974).
257. Doctrinally, the fighting words principle requires that the speaker's language constitute
both a personally abusive epithet and be likely to cause an immediate violent response. See text
accompanying notes 30-36 supra. Nevertheless, the continued existence of the fighting words doc-
trine presumes that there exist personally abusive epithets which will cause reactive violence. See
Rutzick, supra note 120, at 8.
258. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S.
611 (1971); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
259. See notes 147-61 supra and accompanying text.
260. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 23.
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insult must not merely annoy or anger the ordinary, reasonable person
in today's society. The insult must cause such a person to uncontrol-
lably respond with immediate violence.
There may have been a time in this country when a gentleman was
duty bound to respond to an offensive word with a challenge to duel261
and when the adage "you must not call a man a bastard unless you are
prepared to prove it on his front teeth"2 62 contained a kernel of truth.
One suspects, however, that our society has changed, if not necessarily
progressed. Adages such as the one written by Rudyard Kipling at the
turn of the century today ring of the quaint morality of a bygone era.
The relevant question is whether unseemly insults are likely to cause
the ordinary reasonable law abiding person in today's society to react
with an uncontrollable violent impulse. All of the available evidence
suggests that the answer is no.
The very nature of the fighting words problem suggests that it invari-
ably arises in situations in which "the danger. . . has matured by the
time of trial or it was never present. ' 263 Nevertheless, in none of the
fighting words cases litigated in the United States Supreme Court has
the personally abusive epithet uttered by the defendant been followed
by violence from the person addressed. A similar absence of respon-
sive violence in the lower court cases necessitates a conclusion that the
Court's assumption that personally abusive epithets will cause an irre-
sistible violent impulse in the addressee is contrary to common experi-
ence. That offensive insults may cause anger or annoyance, but not
immediate violence, is confirmed by modem psychology.26
Upon reflection, it should not be surprising that offensive language,
even if directed face-to-face to a particular individual, creates no sub-
stantial likelihood of responsive violence. If the Court finds it impossi-
ble, especially given the racial, ethnic, and cultural pluralism of our
nation, to identify which words are offensive,265 how can it reasonably
be assumed that the judiciary can make the more difficult determina-
tion of which offensive words are likely to trigger a violent response?
261. See Wade, Tort Liability/or Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REv. 63, 82-83
(1950).
262. R. KIPLING, The Drums of the Fore andAft, in KIPLING'S STORIES 8 (1931).
263. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 568 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
264. See Letter from Professor Percy Tannenbaum to Professor John Kaplan, reprinted in W.
COHEN & J. KAPLAN, BILL OF RIGHTS 141-44 (1976); see also D. ZILLMANN, HOSTILITY AND
AGGRESSION 276-78 (1979).
265. See text accompanying notes 253-57 supra.
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Unlike the hostile audience problem, fighting words by definition occur
only when the unseemly language is addressed face-to-face to a partic-
ular individual. The recipient is less likely to respond violently in a
face-to-face confrontation, however, because of the absence of a sym-
pathetic crowd to hide his identity and bolster his courage. Moreover,
"[I]anguage likely to offend the sensibility of some listeners is now
fairly commonplace in many social gatherings as well as in public per-
formances." '266 For better or worse, in our society even the ultimate
insult, "[m]-f-, is an everyday expression that punctuates everyday
street language. The term has been 'debased by overuse to non-mean-
ing.' "267 The entire matter was perceptively summarized by the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals:
Some persons might be offended by being called a "bum" or an "S.O.B."
yet others might consider the source of the insult and laugh it off. It is
highly doubtful that the government has much of a legitimate interest in
punishment of "name calling" between private parties .... It is improb-
able that most scurrilous or offensive speech, even though directed at a
specific person, will result in anything more than public inconvenience,
annoyance or unrest.2 68
That the Supreme Court's assumption that an offensive word di-
rected face-to-face to another will be likely to cause an immediate and
uncontrollable violent response is totally unfounded can be seen clearly
by comparing the law's response to criminal libel legislation. Under
the doctrine of criminal libel a person becomes subject to penal sanc-
tions if he addresses a defamatory statement to another in the presence
of third persons. 269 Whatever the likelihood that a person might re-
spond to an offensive word with immediate violence, certainly it is no
greater, and probably less, than the likelihood that a person might re-
spond violently to an unfounded allegation that she is a cheat, thief,
murderer, prostitute, or liar. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has in-
sightfully held that the governmental interest in preventing breaches of
the peace cannot justify the criminalization of libelous utterances:
Changing mores and the virtual disappearance of criminal libel prosecu-
tions lend support to the observation that ". . .under modem conditions,
when the rule of law is generally accepted as a substitute for private phys-
266. Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 700 (1974).
267. Stewart v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 321, 323 (D.D.C. 1976) (quoting Von Sleichter v.
United States, 472 F.2d 1244, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
268. Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1093 (8th Cir. 1973).
269. See the statutes collected in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 70 n.7 (1964).
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ical measures, it can hardly be urged that the maintenance of peace re-
quires a criminal prosecution for private defamation." 270
Similar considerations convinced the ALI Reporters who drafted the
Model Penal Code that the proscription of criminal libel was no longer
appropriate:
It goes without saying that penal sanctions cannot be justified merely
by the fact that defamation is evil or damaging to a person in ways that
entitled him to maintain a civil suit. Usually we reserve the criminal law
for harmful behavior which exceptionally disturbs the community's sense
of security. . . It seems evident that personal calumny falls in neither
of these classes in the U.S.A., that it is therefore inappropriate for penal
control, and that this probably accounts for the paucity of prosecutions
and the near desuetude of private criminal libel legislation in this country
271
The considerations that have led the Supreme Court to hold that the
governmental interest in preventing breaches of the peace cannot jus-
tify the continued constitutionality of criminal libel legislation are
equally applicable to the fighting words doctrine. In neither circum-
stance is there any real likelihood that the ordinary, reasonable law-
abiding person in today's society will be aroused beyond anger to an
uncontrollable and immediate violent reaction.
Even if we assume, contrary to reality, that fighting words elicit an
irresistible impulse to an immediate violent reaction in the addressee,
the doctrine fares no better. The relevant question then becomes
whether the doctrine has any perceptible effect on preventing or deter-
ring either the use of personally abusive epithets or the violent reac-
tions of addressees. It is ludicrous to assume that the type of person
who responds violently to a verbal insult would be deterred from doing
so because of the availability of a criminal sanction against the speaker,
especially when it is doubtful that the government would consider the
matter serious enough to warrant prosection. 72 No doubt a recipient
270. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 69 (quoting Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the
First Amendment 72 YALE L.J. 877, 924 (1963)).
271. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.7, Comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961), quotedin Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 69-70.
272. See Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv.
1033, 1054 (1936). Cf. Bohlen, Consent as 4ffecting Civil Liability for Breaches of the Peace, 24
COLUM. L. REv. 819, 831 (1924) ("Is it not against common experience to suppose that the person
intent upon satisfying his grievances by the primitive method of taking it out of the hide of his
enemy would stop to consider the effect of his conduct upon his right to recover or his liability to
pay damages?").
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response of "wait here while I call a police officer" is even more im-
probable than a violent reaction. In reality, most reasonable people
have become accustomed to personally abusive epithets as a rare and
unpleasant, but inescapable, aspect of modem living in our society.
Furthermore, the entire premise of the fighting words doctrine is that
such epithets cause a visceral, violent reaction, by definition not subject
to intellectual control. Similarly, the increasing prevalence of un-
seemly language in our society and the fact that such words are gener-
ally used by people only when emotionally upsetting circumstances
cause them to momentarily lose their self-control273 suggest that the
fighting words doctrine has been understandably unsuccessful in deter-
ring the use of unseemly insults. There is no reason to believe that the
doctrine will be any more successful in this regard in the future. Thus,
even if personally abusive epithets cause reactive violence, it is dubious
that the fighting words doctrine would successfully reduce the
probability or incidence of violence.
The final flaw in the protection of the public peace rationale for the
fighting words doctrine is that it totally ignores the equities of the situa-
tion and unjustly imposes criminal punishment on the individual en-
gaged in expression that, absent the lawless propensity of the hearer,
would be unequivocally entitled to first amendment protection. It un-
justifiably "makes a man a criminal simply because his neighbors have
no self-control and cannot refrain from violence. 2 74 No one has ever
suggested that a person who commits an assault on another can defeat
civil or criminal liability by claiming he was first addressed with a per-
sonally abusive epithet.275 Except for the anomalous fighting words
doctrine, the law is clear that the person who insults another and is
assaulted in response is "the victim, not the author of a breach of the
peace. 2
76
Perhaps in recognition of the frailty of the protection of the public
peace rationale,27 7 a minority on the Supreme Court has sought to rein-
273. See text accompanying note 217 supra.
274. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966) (quoting Z. CHAFFEE, supra note 19, at
151).
275. See 6 AM. JUR. 2d Assault and Battery §§ 61, 151 (1963); 6A C.J.S. Assault and Battery
§§ 18, 86 (1975).
276. A. DiCEY, LAW OF THE CONSTrrUTION 274 (9th ed., 1939).
277. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (little
likelihood that recipient would respond with immediate violence); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408
U.S. 901, 903 (1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (same); id. at 905 (Powell, J., dissenting) (same).
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vigorate the long discredited dicta in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire278
that offensive words can be censored either because (1) such words in-
flict emotional distress upon the recipient, or because (2) such language
is not "speech" within the protection of the first amendment since, ar-
guably, it is not necessary to convey any ideas. 279
It should be explicitly recognized that neither rationale can be per-
suasively limited to justify only the proscription of fighting words as
they have been historically defined by the Supreme Court. Instead,
these rationales attack the broader premise that offensive words are en-
titled to first amendment protection. Moreover, it should be expressly
understood that the Chaplinsky dicta has never been relied upon by the
Supreme Court as a justification for the fighting words doctrine.2 °0 If
accepted, the position of the dissenting Justices would turn the constitu-
tional clock back at least forty years. Nevertheless, these arguments
should be briefly addressed because of the vigor with which they have
been asserted and because a plurality of the Court recently relied upon
them in a factually dissimilar case, FCC v. Pacjfca Foundation.28" 1 That
case held that the unique and subordinate constitutional status of the
electronic media and the presence of captive listeners and children in
the audience combined to justify the censorship of certain offensive
words on the radio.2 8 2 Whatever the merits of the Court's holding in
Pacfca,283 neither of the rationales suggested by the dicta in Chaplin-
sky adequately justify the censorship of offensive words absent the ad-
ditional elements present in Pacfica.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that offensive
language causes such severe emotional distress to the hearer that it
But see Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. at 141 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (likely that
police officer would react to verbal abuse with violence).
278. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
279. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. at 14-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id.
at 911-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
280. See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
281. 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion). See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding use of zoning power to regulate location of adult
movie houses).
282. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 748-51.
283. Pacoca has been severely criticized by academic commentators. See, e.g., Gard & En-
dress, The Impact of Pacfca Foundation on Two Traditions of Freedom of Expression, 27 CLaV. ST.
L. REv. 465 (1979); Waters, Pac¢ca and the Broadcast of Indecency, 16 Hous. L. REv. 551 (1979).
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
should be deprived of first amendment protection. 284 Even assuming
that unseemly expressions cause serious mental disturbance in the
hearer, the Court's traditional constitutional conclusion is entirely ap-
propriate. The dangers of recognizing such an amorphous and limitless
grievance as a justification for governmental censorship would seri-
ously undermine the paramount societal values embodied in the first
amendment. "[Tihe interest in protecting 'sensibilities' has no physical
component. The only manner in which an individual's 'sensibilities'
are known to be affected is by the individual's statement to that effect.
There is no objective measure of the extent of harm to 'sensibilities'
from the utterance of any specific words. ' 285 This innate vagueness of
the interest in preventing emotional injury to listeners suggests that any
attempt at judicial enforcement will inevitably result in the imposition
of judges' subjective linguistic preferences on society, discrimination
against ethnic and racial minorities, and ultimately the misuse of the
rationale to justify the censorship of the ideological content of the
speaker's message.286 Offensive words are an inevitable byproduct of
strenuous discussions by citizens who are deeply moved by the subject
matter of their expression and who are unable to express the extent of
their emotional commitment without the use of language that others
might deem unseemly, but that the speaker believes essential to convey
his actual meaning.287
Despite these persuasive reasons for refusing to grant judicial recog-
nition to the asserted interest in preventing injuries to individual sensi-
bilities, many commentators persist in arguing that offensive words
constitute verbal assaults that ought to be censored by the govern-
ment.288 The issue which has never been seriously addressed, however,
is whether such words, which are unhappily "fairly commonplace in
many social gatherings as well as in public performances," 289 cause any
more severe reaction than mere discomfort and momentary unpleas-
antness. Stated in this fashion the issue is whether "[a]doption of the
suggested principle would open up a wide vista of litigation in the field
284. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
285. Rutzick, supra note 120, at 7.
286. See text accompanying notes 253-56 supra.
287. See notes 246-52 supra and accompanying text.
288. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 29, at 72-73; Rabinowitz, supra note 29, at 277-79; Shea,
supra note 24, at 22.
289. Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 700 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
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of bad manners, where relatively minor annoyances had better be dealt
with by instruments of social control other than the law."290
Tort law, the branch of our jurisprudence primarily responsible for
the redress of personal injuries, provides the basis for the proper judi-
cial response to the issue of whether offensive words cause such severe
emotional distress to the hearer that they should be officially prohib-
ited. From its very beginnings in this Nation to the present day, the
law of torts has consistently held that although personally abusive epi-
thets may cause momentary hurt feelings, such a minor injury is simply
too trivial for the law to recognize. 29' Dean Prosser aptly summarized
the rationale for refusing to allow offensive words to form the basis of a
legal complaint:
[Wihere there is petty insult, indignity, annoyance or threat, the case con-
spicuously lacks the necessary assurance that the asserted mental distress
is genuine, or that if genuine it is serious and reasonable. When a citizen
who has been called a son of a bitch testifies that the epithet has destroyed
his sleep, ruined his digestion, wrecked his nervous system and perma-
nently impaired his health, other citizens who have on occasion been
called the same thing without catastrophic harm may have legitimate
doubts if he was really so upset, or that if he were his sufferings could
possibly be so reasonable and justified under the circumstances as to be
entitled to compensation. 29
2
A claim that such language is not "speech" within the protection of
the first amendment cannot intelligibly rationalize the fighting words
doctrine. If the Court determines that the expression at issue is unwor-
thy of the label "speech" then no justification for its suppression is nec-
essary.293 The analytical premises of this extraordinarily harsh and
restrictive doctrine, which operates as an absolutist interpretation of the
first amendment in reverse, were destroyed by Professor Kalven two
decades ago.2 94 It has been abandoned by the Supreme Court in every
area of first amendment jurisprudence295 except obscenity, in which the
290. Magruder, supra note 272, at 1035.
291. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment d (1965); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 54-55 (4th ed., 1971).
292. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAhLF. L. REV. 40, 44-45 (1956).
293. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250
(1952); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See also H. KALVEN, supra note 105, at 46;
Kalven, supra note 55, at 10-11.
294. Karst, supra note 1, at 30 (citing Kalven, supra note 55). See also H. KALVEN, supra note
105, at 44-50.
295. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
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Court has fallen into a hopeless quagmire.296 Even the solitary aca-
demic advocate of this two level theory admits that it is not suited for
application to the problem of fighting words or offensive language.
297
IV. CONCLUSION
Since Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the United States Supreme
Court has relied exclusively on the governmental interest in preventing
breaches of the peace to justify the continued constitutionality of the
fighting words doctrine. The Court has held that under this doctrine
offensive language can be censored only if it (1) constitutes a person-
ally abusive epithet; (2) addressed in a face-to-face manner; (3) to a
specific individual; and (4) uttered under such circumstances that the
words have a direct tendency to cause an immediate violent response
by the ordinary, reasonable recipient. Only in the rare case in which
these four elements coalesce may the government proscribe expression
without violating the first amendment.
The reported cases demonstrate that the fighting words doctrine is
seldom, if ever, used for its intended purpose. Instead, it is almost uni-
formly invoked in a selective and discriminatory manner by law en-
forcement officials to punish trivial violations of a constitutionally
impermissible interest in preventing criticism of official conduct.
Under these circumstances, it is important to recognize that the doc-
trine is, at best, a quaint remnant of a bygone morality. Analytically, it
is fallacious to believe that personally abusive epithets, even if ad-
dressed face-to-face to the object of the speaker's criticism, are likely to
arouse the ordinary law abiding person beyond mere anger to uncon-
trollable reflexive violence. Further, even if one unrealistically assumes
that reflexive violence will result, it is unlikely that the fighting words
doctrine can successfully deter such lawless conduct.
Traditionally, the fighting words doctrifie has been justified on the
improbable supposition that it is commonly invoked to protect one pri-
vate individual from being insulted by another private individual.
425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (fighting
words); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel).
296. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See also Smith v. United States, 431
U.S. 291, 311 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Threatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 73
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
297. See Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenit'" An Exercise in the Inter-
pretation of Constitutional Language, 67 Gao. L. J. 899, 920-21, 923-24 (1979).
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Even in this situation, however, the interest in preventing minor indig-
nation and hurt feelings is too trivial for the law's cognizance: "There
is no occasion for the law to intervene with balm for wounded feelings
in every case where a flood of billingsgate is loosed in an argument
over a back fence." '298 When considered in light of the predominant
societal interest in free and uninhibited expression, even candid and
unpleasant expression, the fighting words doctrine cannot withstand
first amendment scrutiny.
298. W. PROSSER, supra note 291, at 54.
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